Target: Bin Laden

The shaky politics of Pakistan and doubts about Al Qaeda could soon put the terrorist leader in our grasp.

April 13, 2008

Osama bin Laden lives among friends, follows news on satellite television or the Internet and reads books about American foreign policy; this much can be safely inferred from his periodic audio and video statements. His latest topical punditry surfaced just a few weeks ago on jihadi websites when he addressed violence in Gaza and the pope's travels.

Because of his passable grasp of current events, Bin Laden may well understand what many Americans do not: that he is more likely to be killed or captured during the next year or so than at any time since late 2001, when he escaped U.S. warplanes bombing him in eastern Afghanistan, at Tora Bora.

This welcome change in probabilities has almost nothing to do with the Bush administration's counter-terrorism strategy, which remains rudderless and starved of resources because of the war in Iraq. It is a consequence, instead, of dramatic political changes in Pakistan, where Bin Laden is believed to be hiding and where Al Qaeda's local mistakes and the restoration of civilian democracy have combined to make him considerably less safe.

Bin Laden's personal approval rating in Pakistan, as measured by a number of international polls, is plummeting. Beginning last year, Al Qaeda began to support an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings on Pakistani soil; the campaign culminated in the murder of two-time former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December. Before, when Bin Laden targeted the United States and Europe, many Pakistanis saw him as an Islamic folk hero. But although Pakistanis remain deeply skeptical about the United States, they have changed their thinking about Al Qaeda as hundreds of their own innocent civilians have become its victims.

In a poll released in February, Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based nonprofit group, found that Bin Laden's popularity had fallen by half over just six months, to about 24%. In the Northwest Frontier Province, along the Afghan borderlands where he is most likely to be hiding, it fell into single digits. Recent British polling in the most radicalized border areas is less encouraging, but there is no doubt that the general picture in the Northwest Frontier is one of increasing anxiety and resentment toward Al Qaeda.

These souring attitudes are important because, in the past, hunts for terrorists hiding in Pakistan have almost always ended when a disillusioned (and generally greedy) local resident has dropped a dime on the fugitive for reward money. During the 1990s, for example, it took a number of frustrating years until the United States tracked down Mir Amal Kasi, a Pakistani who killed two CIA workers outside the agency's headquarters in 1993. It took about as long to locate Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the architect of the first World Trade Center bombing; colleagues ultimately betrayed both men. Now that a larger number of Pakistanis see Bin Laden as a nihilistic killer, the chances that such a walk-in informant will surface have grown.

So have the odds that the Pakistani government will act on such information. For six years after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration undermined the search for Bin Laden by organizing its alliance with Pakistan in a way that created perverse incentives -- incentives that actually encouraged the Pakistanis not to find him. It did this by providing unquestioning support to the country's military leader, President Pervez Musharraf, and by sending more than 90% of its $10 billion-plus in aid to the Pakistan army or the army-controlled government. Much of this aid is still paid today as direct "rent" for counter-terrorism operations by the army and its principal intelligence branch.

The structure of this U.S.-aid pipeline, set against the decades-long history of on-again, off-again American support for Pakistan, encouraged Pakistan's top military commanders to believe that if Bin Laden were ever captured or killed, the U.S. might reduce its support or even go home. A fugitive Bin Laden became their meal ticket.

Now these incentives have been at least partly reversed. Musharraf's popularity and authority have collapsed in Pakistan following a succession of political blunders. Bhutto's widower, Asif Ali Zardari, who leads the newly elected civilian government behind the scenes, claimed before the national vote in February -- both at home and in Washington -- that the restoration of democracy would be a much more reliable means to defeat terrorism in Pakistan than America's narrow reliance on Musharraf. Zardari's more sophisticated advisors, such as Pakistan's new ambassador at large, Husain Haqqani, a long-time professor at Boston University, understand that this theory of democracy-as-counter-terrorism is viewed with considerable skepticism at the Pentagon and inside Washington's intelligence bureaucracy.

Pakistan's new democratic government should now be motivated to prove its case. Delivering Bin Laden -- which Musharraf's government so conspicuously failed to do -- would be a coup of global proportions for Pakistan's new civilian leaders, and it would bring considerable political and other rewards to Islamabad. It would demonstrate, in the most dramatic way possible, that a democratic government can be as effective a partner in counter-terrorism as the army, if not more so, and by doing this, it would change debate in Washington and Europe about the costs and benefits of investing in democracy in Pakistan.

This new equation of incentives inside Pakistan is highly complex -- for example, the army and the intelligence service have their own institutional interests, and this may lead them to resist entreaties from civilian leaders to step up the hunt for Bin Laden -- but the previous stalemate that governed the hunt, and which led to years of willful and self-conscious passivity in Pakistan's leadership, has at last been broken. Now, at least somebody in Pakistan's government has a good reason to find Bin Laden. And striking at a time when the Al Qaeda leader's local popularity has collapsed reduces the domestic political risks.

Where would they look? All of the best evidence -- the media pipeline that delivers Bin Laden's statements; the circumstantial evidence visible in his videos; fragments of available intelligence reporting and the known history of his movements -- points to Pakistan. Anything, of course, is possible -- perhaps we will discover some day that he was living all along in a suburb of Paris and conducting the most successful deception operation in history. But that seems unlikely.

Within Pakistan, an urban hideaway cannot be ruled out. Other Al Qaeda fugitives, such as Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, have been discovered in Pakistan's cities. But even if Bin Laden has shaved his beard and filled his wardrobe with baggy jeans, he would be taking enormous risks if he set up in a Karachi condo or a Rawalpindi town house.

By far the most likely scenario, as officials have repeatedly suggested, is that he has hunkered down in a secluded, mud-walled tribal compound along the Afghan border. This is territory where he has had many friends for years and where Pakistan's national government today has very little presence. The tribal agencies of North Waziristan and Bajaur seem the most likely sanctuaries. Unfortunately, "narrowing" the search to such vast and remote places along Pakistan's 1,200-mile border with Afghanistan is like narrowing a search to Alaska -- if Alaska's population were deeply hostile to outsiders.

Would it matter much if Bin Laden were killed or caught? Al Qaeda has grown beyond the point where decapitating its leadership would end the organization, but Bin Laden has been a charismatic leader, and if he were killed, the resulting succession struggles might prove problematic for the organization. If he is not captured, silencing his on-air commentary would also be moderately helpful.

But the biggest reason to find him is the same as it has been since November 2001. That month, a video discovered in Afghanistan showed a notably self-satisfied Bin Laden smiling as he described how, on the basis of his engineering studies, he had calculated that fire and explosions from the 9/11 attacks might cause a few interior floors of the Twin Towers to collapse, crushing those inside, but that he had been surprised -- and delighted, as his tone of voice conveyed -- that the World Trade Center buildings had collapsed completely. The simplest principles of justice remain more than ample in this cause.

Steve Coll, president of the New America Foundation and a staff writer at the New Yorker, is the author of "The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century." His previous book, "Ghost Wars," won the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction in 2005.

Out of Guantanamo and Bitter Toward Bin Laden

By Faiza Saleh Ambah
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, March 24, 2008; A08

JIDDAH, Saudi Arabia -- A calling to defend fellow Muslims and a bit of aimlessness took Khalid al-Hubayshi to a separatists' training camp in the southern Philippines and to the mountains of Afghanistan, where he interviewed for a job with Osama bin Laden.

Hubayshi, 32, a Saudi native, was among the Arab fighters dug in with bin Laden in the mountains of Tora Bora during the U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan in 2001. He later spent time in the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in a Saudi jail.

He was released in 2006 into a world radically altered by the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Muslim fighters were no longer viewed in Arab countries as larger-than-life heroes, and clerics had stopped urging young Muslims to fulfill their religious duties by fighting on behalf of their brethren.

Hubayshi had also changed. He had grown disillusioned with bin Laden, whose initial idealism had turned into terrorism, he said, adding that his family, "not bin Laden," had suffered when he was at Guantanamo.

U.S. government documents and a series of interviews with Hubayshi provide a rare look into the mind and motivation of a man who trained for religious warfare, never fought in combat and now says he believes in the political process.

His life today in the city of Jiddah is comfortably routine. On most days, he wakes before dawn, drinks an espresso made by his wife and takes a 90-minute bus ride to his job as a controller at a utilities company. But "if the government had not helped me marry and get my job back," he said, "I might be in Iraq now."

In 1995, Hubayshi was a 19-year-old college student looking for more meaning in his life. Bin Laden was a hero to many Muslims, and aiding Muslims in distress seemed like the most admirable and altruistic route. He was initially inspired by a fiery taped sermon extolling the virtues of waging war against the enemies of Islam, but a series of videotapes produced by Arabs fighting in Bosnia completed his transformation.

The tapes showed Muslim women and children sprawled dead and bloodied in a market. One woman's head had been blown off. Muslim civilians with rifles were shown fighting the Serbian army, and the only ones helping them, Hubayshi said, were Arab fighters trained in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets.

"I couldn't sleep at night knowing that women were being raped and children slaughtered, just because they were Muslim," he said. "I had to do something."

By the time he got in touch with the Arabs fighting in Bosnia, the war was over. So Hubayshi took a five-week vacation from his new job at the utilities company and made his way to the southern Philippines, where he lived in wooden shacks in a humid jungle camp for Arab fighters. He said he slept well for the first time since seeing the Bosnia tapes.

But the Philippine separatists lay low most of the time he was there, and he soon felt restless and yearned for better training.

His contacts arranged for him to go to Afghanistan, and in 1997 he went to a camp in the southeastern city of Khost. He learned to fire antiaircraft missiles, antiaircraft machine guns, antitank weapons and rocket-propelled grenades and became an expert in explosives.

By 1999, the fighting in Afghanistan had become mostly ethnic. He packed his bags to return to Saudi Arabia. "I was not there . . . to help Afghans fighting Afghans for political gain," he said. "If I was going to die, I wanted to die fighting for something meaningful."

As he was making his way home, he was arrested in Pakistan at the Peshawar airport and sent to prison.

Hubayshi said that he was released two months later but that the Pakistanis kept his passport. He traveled on a fake passport to Yemen and was smuggled into Saudi Arabia, where he returned to work at the utilities company.

Two years later, he learned that he was wanted for questioning by Saudi authorities. Not willing to risk jail, he left the country on a fake passport and returned to Afghanistan in May 2001, he said.

In the years that he had been away from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's influence had spread and the organization had become more like a corporation, he said, with company cars and many safe houses. The Taliban, a radical Islamist militia that had taken control of most of the country by 1996, had also grown more powerful.

Hubayshi became adept at making remote-controlled explosive devices triggered by cellphones and light switches. Impressed by his skills, an associate of bin Laden's asked him to join al-Qaeda, or at least meet with bin Laden, he said.

In the summer of 2001, Hubayshi recalled, he spent half an hour with bin Laden at a converted military barracks near the city of Kandahar. The two sat on carpets in bin Laden's office and shared a fruit platter.

"What are my duties toward you, and what are your duties toward me, if I join with you?" Hubayshi said he asked.

"That you don't betray us and we don't betray you," bin Laden responded, and offered him a plot of land, Hubayshi said.

But bin Laden's "fight had changed from defending Muslims to attacking the United States. I wasn't convinced of his ideology. And I wanted to be independent, not just another minion in this big group."

On Sept. 11, 2001, Hubayshi said, he was training Chechen fighters in explosives in the eastern city of Jalalabad. In October, when the first U.S. airstrikes hit Jalalabad, the Afghans "blamed us . . . and forced us out of the city at night. We slept by the river for two weeks."

Weeks later, an associate of bin Laden came seeking experienced fighters, and those without families left for Tora Bora. In the trenches there, the fighters ate and slept and cleaned their weapons, surrounded by the distant sounds of bombardments.

"Bin Laden was convinced the Americans would come down and fight. We spent five weeks like that, manning our positions in case the Americans landed," he said.

As the airstrikes moved closer, and with the United States' Afghan allies advancing, bin Laden decided to retreat and left one morning. His aides told 300 Arab fighters to make their way to Pakistan and surrender to their embassies.

Pakistani authorities stopped the fighters near the border and handed them over to the U.S. military, which sent them to Guantanamo Bay.

Hubayshi remains bitter about what he considers bin Laden's betrayal: calling the fighters to Tora Bora and then abandoning them there. "The whole way to Cuba, I prayed the plane would fall," he said. "There was no dignity in what he made us do."

Hubayshi said he is sorry that Muslims carried out the Sept. 11 attacks because they targeted civilians: "That was wrong. Jihad is fighting soldier to soldier."

His wife of one year said she had been looking for a husband who did not take drugs or drink alcohol, who was polite and had a kind mother. "He is a very good husband," the 26-year-old said on condition that her name not be published. Some segments of Saudi society follow strict social codes that deem it shameful for a woman's name to be made public.

In all the years he spent trying to help Muslims, Hubayshi said, he regrets he did not do more.

"My dream was that I would fight when there was fighting, and teach children when there was peace," he said. "I'm sorry we left Afghanistan with so much war and death. I wish we had built hospitals or schools."

Vatican Security Worries Over bin Laden Tape

By IAN FISHER

ROME — The Vatican on Thursday rejected an audiotaped accusation from Osama bin Laden that Pope Benedict XVI was leading a “new Crusade” against Muslims, but Italian security officials were concerned about the threats included in Mr. bin Laden’s new message.

“These accusations are absolutely unfounded,” the Rev. Federico Lombardi, the pope’s chief spokesman, said in a telephone interview. “There is nothing new in this, and it doesn’t have any particular significance for us.”

The audio message attributed to Mr. bin Laden was released Wednesday night and was addressed to “the intelligent ones in the European Union.” It was posted on a militant Web site on Wednesday, and an English transcription was distributed Thursday by the SITE Intelligence Group in Bethesda, Md., which tracks postings by Al Qaeda on the Internet.

The audiotape listed broad grievances, but specifically mentioned the pope, and coincided with the busiest week of the year at the Vatican, the week leading up to Easter Sunday. The pope, who turns 81 next month, will appear at several public events, including the annual Good Friday procession of the Stations of the Cross at the Colosseum.

In the five-minute message, the speaker said there would be a “severe” reaction against the publication in Europe of cartoons many Muslims considered offensive to the Prophet Muhammad. He said the cartoons — one reprinted last month in Denmark, more than two years after they were first published there — “came in the framework of a new Crusade in which the pope of the Vatican has played a large, lengthy role.”

Without naming any specific action or target, the speaker said, “The response will be what you see and not what you hear, and let our mothers bereave us if we do not make victorious our messenger of God.”

Father Lombardi dismissed the accusations, noting that the pope had condemned the cartoons several times and stressed that “religion must be respected.”

Al Qaeda and its supporters have issued several threats against the pope since he quoted a medieval Byzantine emperor in a speech in Germany two years ago referring to Islam as “evil and inhuman.” The pope apologized for the anger caused by the speech, saying that the view expressed in the quotation was not his own.

Asked about heightened security concerns, Father Lombardi said the recording “does not in any way affect the conduct of the pope.” He said the Vatican had no plans for any more security than what was already in place for the public events leading up to Easter.

An Italian security official, however, was quoted anonymously on Thursday by the ANSA news agency as saying that officials were taking the threats “seriously.” A spokesman for the nation’s Interior Ministry declined to answer specific questions about the threat, referring a reporter to the ANSA report.

The report stated that Italian antiterrorism officials would meet Friday to analyze the tape. It said the message would be “examined with attention to the threat surrounding the pope.” Though the Vatican is technically a separate and sovereign state, Italy provides policing and security for the pope.

After violent demonstrations against his speech two years ago, the pope has called frequently for dialogue between Christians and Muslims. A delegation of Muslim scholars met with Vatican officials this month to prepare for broader talks between the pope and Muslim representatives later this year.

Benedict XVI is scheduled to make his first visit as pope to the United States from April 15 to 20, with stops in New York and Washington. The Secret Service and the New York Police Department, responsible for the pope’s security on the trip, had no comment on the bin Laden audiotape.

Paul J. Browne, a deputy police commissioner in New York, said in an e-mailed statement that the department “has been working closely with the United States Secret Service to provide the highest level of protection possible for the pope during his visit to New York.”

Daniele Pinto contributed reporting.

Bin Laden Threatens Europe Over Muhammad Cartoons

By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, March 20, 2008; A11

BERLIN, March 19 -- In a new audiotape released Wednesday, Osama bin Laden warned Europeans that they will face a "severe reckoning" for repeatedly publishing cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in newspapers and magazines.

The five-minute speech was the second time in four months that bin Laden has delivered threats to European countries. He made only one oblique reference to President Bush -- calling him "your aggressive ally . . . who is about to depart the White House" -- and instead addressed his remarks to "the intelligent ones in the European Union."

The al-Qaeda leader criticized European countries for joining in military campaigns in Muslim lands. Although he lamented those actions, he suggested that the Muhammad cartoons were even more immoral and that retaliation was coming.

"It paled when you went overboard in your unbelief . . . and went to the extent of publishing those insulting drawings," he said. "If there is no check on your freedom of words, then let your hearts be open to the freedom of our actions."

The audio recording was accompanied by a still photograph of bin Laden holding an automatic rifle and was released by As-Sahab, the media arm of al-Qaeda.

In 2006, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12 cartoons depicting Muhammad, prompting protests throughout the Muslim world. Followers of the faith generally consider depictions of the prophet blasphemous. Other European publications reprinted the cartoons, citing the right to free speech.

Last month, a cartoon showing Muhammad with a bomb for a turban was reprinted in Danish newspapers after police in Copenhagen said they had disrupted an assassination plot against the illustrator.

Staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.

The New Al-Qaeda Central

Far From Declining, the Network Has Rebuilt, With Fresh Faces and a Vigorous Media Arm

By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, September 9, 2007; A01

PESHAWAR, Pakistan -- When Osama bin Laden resurfaced Friday in a 26-minute videotaped speech, his most important message was one left unsaid: We have survived.

The last time bin Laden showed his face to the world was three years ago, in October 2004. Since then, al-Qaeda's core leadership -- dubbed al-Qaeda Central by intelligence analysts -- has grown stronger, rebuilding the organizational framework that was badly damaged after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, according to counterterrorism officials in Pakistan, the United States and Europe.

It has accomplished this revival, the officials said in interviews, by drawing on lessons learned during 15 years of failed campaigns to destroy it. In that period, bin Laden and his followers have outfoxed powerful enemies from the Soviet army to the Saudi royal family to the CIA.

Dodging the U.S. military in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, al-Qaeda Central reconstituted itself across the Pakistani border, returning to the rugged tribal areas surrounding the organization's birthplace, the dusty frontier city of Peshawar. In the first few years, Pakistani and U.S. authorities captured many senior leaders; in the past 18 months, no major figure has been killed or caught in Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda Central moved quickly to overcome extensive leadership losses by promoting loyalists who had served alongside bin Laden for years. It restarted fundraising, recruiting and training. And it expanded its media arm into perhaps the most effective propaganda machine ever assembled by a terrorist or insurgent network.

Today, al-Qaeda operates much the way it did before 2001. The network is governed by a shura, or leadership council, that meets regularly and reports to bin Laden, who continues to approve some major decisions, according to a senior U.S. intelligence official. About 200 people belong to the core group and many receive regular salaries, another senior U.S. intelligence official said.

"They do appear to meet with a frequency that enables them to act as an organization and not just as a loose bunch of guys," the second official said.

Operatives are organized into cells with separate missions, such as fundraising or logistics, and may know the identities of only a few individuals in their circle to prevent infiltration, Pakistani officials said. Most leaders are based in Pakistan, although many travel to Afghanistan and occasionally farther afield, to Iraq, Turkey, Iran, the Caucasus region and North Africa.

Counterterrorism officials were slow to grasp the resurrection of al-Qaeda Central. For years, many U.S. and European intelligence officials characterized it as a spent force, limited to providing inspiration for loosely affiliated regional networks. Bombings in Europe and the Middle East were blamed on homegrown cells of militants, operating independently of bin Laden.

On June 24, 2003, President Bush declared al-Qaeda's leadership largely defunct. At a Camp David summit, Bush praised Pakistan's Gen. Pervez Musharraf, crediting his country with apprehending more than 500 members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

"Thanks to President Musharraf's leadership, on the al-Qaeda front we've dismantled the chief operators," Bush said. Although bin Laden was still at large, his lieutenants were "no longer a threat to the United States or Pakistan," Bush added.

Six months later, Musharraf was nearly killed in an assassination attempt by al-Qaeda operatives. Shortly afterward, a group of al-Qaeda leaders held a summit of their own in the Pakistani region of Waziristan, where they plotted fresh attacks thousands of miles away in Britain, including targets in London and financial institutions in the United States, according to Pakistani officials.

Many U.S., Pakistani and European intelligence officials now agree that al-Qaeda's ability to launch operations around the globe didn't diminish after the invasion of Afghanistan as much as previously thought. Further investigation has shown, for example, that al-Qaeda's leadership, with bin Laden's direct blessing, made the decision to activate sleeper cells in Saudi Arabia in 2003, prompting a wave of car bombings and assassination attempts that the Saudi government has only recently brought under control.

From hideouts in Pakistan, according to court testimony and interviews, bin Laden's deputies ordered attacks on a Tunisian synagogue in 2002, a British consulate and bank in Istanbul in 2003, and the London transit system in 2005.

U.S intelligence officials also blame the al-Qaeda brain trust for orchestrating dozens of other failed plots, including a plan to blow up transatlantic flights from Britain in August 2006.

"All this business about them being isolated or cut off is whistling past the graveyard," said Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst who led the agency's unit assigned to track bin Laden. "We're looking at an organization that is extraordinarily adept at succession planning. They were built to survive, like the Afghans were against the Russians."
A Failed Strike

After nightfall on Jan. 13, 2006, an unmanned Predator aircraft guided by the CIA fired missiles at two houses in the northwestern Pakistani village of Damadola, a few miles from the Afghan border.

The target was a dinner celebrating the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. CIA officials had received intelligence that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's deputy leader, had been invited to attend.

The missiles destroyed the houses and killed more than a dozen people. Zawahiri was not among them, but Pakistani officials soon said the fatalities included several other high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders.

Musharraf identified one of the dead as Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, an Egyptian who had overseen al-Qaeda's research into chemical weapons and carried a $5 million U.S. government bounty on his head.

Musharraf and other Pakistani officials said those buried in the rubble also included Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the Egyptian chief of the al-Qaeda military wing that plots attacks in the West; Khalid Habib, a field commander for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; and Zawahiri's son-in-law, Abdul Rahman al-Maghribi.

U.S. and Pakistani officials now say that none of those al-Qaeda leaders perished in the strike and that only local villagers were killed. The $5 million reward for Umar's capture remains on offer. Masri has continued to rise in the al-Qaeda structure, U.S. officials say, and six months after his supposed death was helping in the failed effort to put bombs aboard airliners flying from Britain.

Mahmood Shah, who at the time of the strike was Pakistan's security chief for the region, said intelligence for the Predator mission stemmed in part from the interrogation of another al-Qaeda leader, Abu Faraj al-Libi, who had been captured eight months earlier in the city of Mardan, also in Pakistan's northwest.

At the time, Shah said, U.S. and Pakistani officials thought merely that the timing of the strike was slightly off and that they had barely missed Zawahiri. Now, he said, he thinks Zawahiri and the others were never there. "I just think the information was not correct," he said.

The only publicized success in the nearly 20 months since the Damadola attack came on April 12, 2006, when Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, an Egyptian al-Qaeda operative indicted for involvement in the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa, was killed in North Waziristan.

Otherwise, the search for al-Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan has hit a wall. Shah said information concerning their whereabouts has grown scarcer and less reliable. By his account, Pakistani security officials haven't come across a single trace of bin Laden in the tribal areas. Occasionally, they have received tips regarding Zawahiri and others, he said, but only several weeks after the trail has run cold.

"We'd hear about their presence two months after the fact. It's just not actionable intelligence," Shah said. "This inner core has absolutely stopped using electronic technology to communicate with each other. That is why the Americans have such trouble finding them."

On Jan. 30, 2006, two weeks after the Damadola missile strike, al-Qaeda released a videotape on the Internet in which Zawahiri taunted his pursuers. "Bush, do you know where I am?" the Egyptian radical said. "I am among the Muslim masses!"
Al-Qaeda's 'Deep Bench'

A major factor in al-Qaeda's resurgence has been its ability to swiftly replace fallen or captured commanders.

CIA Director Michael V. Hayden told Congress in November that the core leadership had benefited from a "deep bench of lower-ranking personnel capable of stepping up to assume leadership responsibilities." Many are veteran jihadists who have fought in Afghanistan and conflicts elsewhere for decades.

Intelligence officials and analysts said al-Qaeda's central command remains dominated by Egyptians, primarily associates of Zawahiri, who formally merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with al-Qaeda in 1998.

One Egyptian who has taken on a bigger role is Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an accountant by training who served as bin Laden's financial manager during his exile in Sudan in the 1990s. In May, al-Qaeda announced that Yazid had been appointed its overall leader in Afghanistan and liaison with the Taliban.

Yazid, 51, was an original member of al-Qaeda's Shura Council and served time in an Egyptian prison with Zawahiri in the early 1980s after both were convicted of participating in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Although he disagreed with bin Laden over the Sept. 11 attacks -- calling them a tactical mistake that resulted in the Taliban's fall from power -- Yazid remains close to the Saudi emir and is trusted by other jihad groups, said Yasser al-Sirri, an Egyptian political exile and director of the London-based Islamic Observation Center.

"Bin Laden appointed him as a conciliatory figure," Sirri said in an interview. "It's because of his credibility. He gets along well with the Pashtuns, with the Taliban -- he gets along well with everybody."

Several other fresh faces in the leadership are former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a now-defunct network that used to operate at arm's length from al-Qaeda.

Among them is Abu Laith al-Libi, the nom de guerre of a longtime jihadist who fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan, spent two years in prison in Saudi Arabia for covert activities there and organized a failed plot to overthrow Libyan ruler Moammar Gaddafi in the mid-1990s.

He began to work closely with bin Laden in 1999 and impressed al-Qaeda's command by leading the retreat from Kabul in 2001 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, said Noman Benotman, a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

"The Saudis and others said, 'Who the hell is this guy?' They were impressed," Benotman said in an interview in London. "He can create operations. He can lead on the front lines. He knows when to attack, when to withdraw."

Abu Laith al-Libi has run training camps in Afghanistan in recent years for al-Qaeda and orchestrated a suicide attack on the U.S. air base in Bagram, killing 23 people, during a visit by Vice President Cheney in February, according to U.S. military officials.

Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a Libyan believed to be in his late 30s, has meanwhile acted as a liaison between al-Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan and al-Qaeda in Iraq, a predominantly Sunni insurgent movement that is believed responsible for some of the deadliest bomb attacks on Shiite civilians in Iraq and is one of the U.S. military's fiercest foes. The group professes loyalty to bin Laden; intelligence analysts are divided as to whether he exercises real control over it.

Rahman has also operated as a bin Laden emissary to militant groups in North Africa that joined forces in January to form al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
Words From 'the Clouds'

Much remains unknown about the internal workings of al-Qaeda Central. As with the old Soviet leadership in the Kremlin, U.S. analysts scrutinize public statements issued by the network for clues on who wields influence.

One figure attracting interest is a Libyan known as Abu Yahya al-Libi, who gained notoriety after he and three other al-Qaeda prisoners escaped from a high-security U.S. military prison in Bagram in July 2005.

Since then, he has appeared on more than a dozen videos produced by al-Qaeda's media arm. His speeches and treatises are so numerous that some analysts speculate he is being groomed to join bin Laden's inner circle. "Abu Yahya al-Libi is now the most visible face of al-Qaeda, surpassing al-Zawahiri, and in fact all of the jihadists," said Ben Venzke, chief executive of IntelCenter, a private terrorism research group that does work for the U.S. government.

In his videos, Abu Yahya al-Libi dresses the part of a gun-toting holy warrior but has made his reputation as a religious hard-liner. He frequently criticizes other Muslims as heretics; favorite targets include Shiites, Hamas and the Saudi royal family.

"He's young, but he's very smart," Benotman said. "For his career, the sky's the limit."

Since 2000, al-Qaeda has run its own media production company, al-Sahab, which means "the clouds" in Arabic, an allusion to the misty mountain peaks of Afghanistan.

Until two years ago, al-Sahab was dependent on broadcasters such as the al-Jazeera satellite television network to air its videos and could distribute only short clips on the Internet. But then it achieved a spectacular breakthrough. Taking advantage of technological advances and bandwidth expansion, it began posting videos directly on the Internet, relying on an anonymous global network of webmasters to shield their electronic tracks.

In 2005, al-Sahab released 16 videos. This year, it has produced four times that number. Quality has improved markedly, with most videos now including subtitles in several languages and sometimes 3-D animation.

"If you want to stop al-Qaeda on the communications front, you should concentrate on their IT manager instead of Osama," said Muhammad Amir Rana, director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, a research group in Lahore, Pakistan, that studies militant groups.

Al-Sahab can now record and release videos with astonishing speed. When Pakistani forces stormed Islamabad's Red Mosque on July 10, resulting in more than 80 deaths, Zawahiri responded the next day with an audiotaped speech, calling the raid "an act of criminal aggression."

Al-Sahab mixes low-tech and high-tech tricks to prevent spy agencies from blocking its releases or tracing videos back to their source, said Evan F. Kohlmann, a New York-based counterterrorism analyst.

The videos are routed through a chain of couriers who hand-deliver them to computer gurus, probably in Pakistan, he said.

They, in turn, electronically send the files to others around the world who upload them to free or hijacked Web sites.

"The process of tracing this stuff back is not that easy," Kohlmann said. "They've created breaks in the distribution chain, both electronic breaks and human breaks."
A Protective Network

In July, U.S. intelligence agencies published a report concluding that al-Qaeda Central had regrouped in remote northwestern Pakistan, aided by a 2005 decision by the Pakistani government to declare a truce with Taliban forces and withdraw troops from the tribal area of Waziristan.

Latif Afridi, a Pashtun tribal elder, said that many places along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan have been effectively taken over by foreign militants, mostly Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens and Arabs. Although they are not all associated with al-Qaeda, bin Laden's network has been able to rely on them for protection, he said.

"We have al-Qaeda, we have Taliban, we have foreigners, and we have Pakistani-trained militant groups that have been banned," Afridi said in an interview in Peshawar. "They're running the show."

Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officials said the number of militant training camps has surged along the border. But unlike al-Qaeda's fixed camps in Afghanistan before 2001, they consist of small groups that gather for a few days for firearms or bombmaking practice before disbanding, making them hard to detect.

The truce between the Taliban and the Pakistani military collapsed in North Waziristan in July and in South Waziristan a month later. Since then, Pakistani forces have reentered the tribal areas and resumed clashes with the Taliban and other militants.

But Asad Durrani, a retired chief of Pakistan's powerful spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence bureau, said it would take more than military intervention to capture al-Qaeda leaders.

Durrani said U.S. bombing campaigns along the Afghan-Pakistani border had thoroughly alienated civilians who otherwise might help root out al-Qaeda commanders. "The first instinct you Americans have is military power -- dropping bombs," he said. "This was absolutely 100 percent guaranteed not to succeed, and it's continued that way for the past six years."

He said it would take a concentrated, methodical approach to find bin Laden and his deputies, relying on human intelligence and simple detective work.

"If they are there, sit back, be patient," Durrani advised. "The good hunter hunts on foot."

Special correspondent Munir Ladaa in Berlin and researchers Alice Crites and Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.

Al Qaeda Threatens; U.S. Frets

By MARK MAZZETTI and DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON

IN the Bush administration’s first analysis of what went wrong in the years leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks, it quickly arrived at a relatively simple conclusion: The Clinton administration was sleepwalking as Al Qaeda strengthened its safe haven in Afghanistan.

After the attacks on American embassies in Africa and the U.S.S. Cole, the Clinton White House determined that invading a sovereign state to rid it of Osama bin Laden was fraught with too many difficulties. So it relied on pinprick attacks, hoping that covert actions and a cruise-missile attack on a training camp might do the trick. Only after nearly 3,000 Americans had died, did the United States invade.

Now, as a National Intelligence Estimate released last week makes clear, the Bush White House finds itself in a similar predicament. Al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in the wild west tribal areas of Pakistan. It is stronger than at any time in years, and it is actively plotting new attacks.

There is a chance, however, that events in Pakistan in recent weeks have at last presented the opportunity for a serious campaign against Islamic radicals in Pakistan, if it’s not already too late. The breakdown of a cease-fire between elders in the tribal lands of Pakistan and the government of President Pervez Musharraf, combined with the determination that General Musharraf showed earlier this month when he ordered an assault on the Red Mosque complex in Islamabad, may have finally given President Bush something his predecessor never had: a partner who may at long last be persuaded to go after an entrenched terrorist haven.

Pakistan experts argue that if General Musharraf were to begin an aggressive campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it wouldn’t be to please Washington. Moreover, coming elections in Pakistan could be the impetus for action as General Musharraf tries to look forceful before his countrymen go to the polls.

“There is recognition on Musharraf’s part that he has an opportunity now that may not exist in a future political configuration because his power may wane,” said Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations, who previously worked on Pakistan issues at the State Department.

A challenge to that power rose again on Friday when the country’s Supreme Court restored the chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, to his post after being suspended by General Musharraf. Mr. Chaudhry, now a hero to an anti-Musharraf movement, could end up ruling on whether the leader can remain the head of the army as he seeks re-election as president.

Washington is captivated by General Musharraf because he is a secular moderate, which is not to be confused with a civil libertarian. John D. Negroponte, the deputy secretary of state who until late last year tracked the gathering Qaeda threat as the director of national intelligence, ended a trip to Pakistan a month ago convinced that General Musharraf’s government had, at long last, gotten the message about the tribal areas in the northwest officially known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

“I found that one of the really decisive factors driving the Pakistani government’s response to the situation is the fact that violence has spread from the FATA to what they called the settled territories,” he said. In the past week alone, he noted, roughly 100 Pakistani soldiers have been killed, largely in bombing attacks, and the army has vowed to stop what General Musharraf calls the “Talibanization” of the country.

While Washington is officially optimistic, it has received promises from General Musharraf before. It was more than two years between the time that he sidelined Abdul Qadeer Khan, the head of the Khan Nuclear Laboratories, and the time he actually put him under house arrest for running the world’s largest nuclear technology smuggling network. In the interim, a lot of damage was done.

On the Afghan border, General Musharraf has promised to pursue and break up the Taliban, but in case after case the Taliban leaders have moved unimpeded between the tribal areas and Afghan villages, while Pakistani troops looked the other way. No one believes that Pakistan’s intelligence service has been purged of Taliban sympathizers.

So when Americans hear General Musharraf’s promises, they are once burned, and twice skeptical. “I’ve heard all this before,” one recently departed senior C.I.A. official with extensive experience in Pakistan and Afghanistan said last week about the administration’s official optimism.

The Pakistani Army, he and others said, is designed, trained and equipped to fight India in Kashmir and deter New Dehli with nuclear weapons. That requires a dramatically different kind of strategy from what is needed in the tribal areas, whose leaders do not consider themselves part of Pakistan.

A senior administration official said on Wednesday that even if General Musharraf had the right intentions, “it’s not clear he’s got the capability,” which is why the United States is rushing to supply him with more money and weapons. And even as they speak publicly about throwing their support behind General Musharraf’s efforts against radicals, administration officials in private find themselves re-enacting those Clinton-era debates about how to dismantle a terrorist haven inside a sovereign country.

The western mountains of Pakistan have been the hatching grounds for some of Al Qaeda’s deadliest plots. Besides the London transportation attacks in July 2005, the thwarted plot to blow up multiple trans-Atlantic commercial jets last August is thought by British and American officials to have been planned by Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas.

But the options facing President Bush are at least as unpalatable as those that confronted President Clinton.

One, of course, would be to initiate aggressive campaigns of deniable covert action in Pakistan to capture or kill Qaeda operatives, and pray that American Special Forces or C.I.A. officers don’t get caught. Another would be to use airstrikes against known terrorist compounds in the tribal areas. A third would involve carrying out a large-scale ground offensive across the border from Afghanistan — sending troops to rumble through villages in the hunt for the world’s most wanted men.

That last option seems, for all intents and purposes, off the table. Sending thousands of heavily armed American soldiers on a cave-to-cave search of North Waziristan, is, in the view of most experts, the least likely means of effectively dismantling Al Qaeda’s Pakistan base of operations. Besides, a decision to allow an American invasion across Pakistan’s western border could very well doom a government the Bush administration considers its best bet.

As for unilateral airstrikes, military and intelligence officials said that information on the whereabouts of top terrorists is rarely precise enough to justify bombings that could result in significant civilian casualties, and a failed airstrike could shut the door to future American operations in the region.

“You could do a hit-and-run really quick,” said one Bush administration official. “But that better be one damn good strike, because there ain’t going to be another.”

The C.I.A. has had occasional success in recent years killing top Qaeda planners with missiles fired from remote-controlled Predator aircraft — a covert action effort that the United States officially denies.

But intelligence officials acknowledge that after each attack, the terror group has merely tapped a deep bench and elevated another operative to a more lofty position.

So the administration that raised military pre-emption to the level of national doctrine after 9/11 is now confronting a more nuanced reality: officials acknowledge they would be hard pressed to mount an all-out attack against the Qaeda redoubt unless the terrorists struck first.

Yet, when asked how the United States would respond if Al Qaeda were to plot a successful attack on the United States from the tribal areas, the answer from one intelligence officials was direct: “We’d go in and flatten it.”

Pakistan militants scrap cease-fire

A suicide bomber kills 26 at a police recruitment center. The death toll from weekend violence tops 70.
By Zulfiqar Ali and Laura King
Special to The Times

July 16, 2007

PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN — With more than 70 people killed in weekend bombings and a controversial cease-fire annulled in Pakistan's volatile frontier zone, the specter loomed Sunday of an all-out war between Islamic militants and the U.S.-backed government of President Pervez Musharraf.

In the latest suicide attack, a bomber blew himself up Sunday at a police recruitment center near Pakistan's tribal region, killing at least 26 people and injuring nearly 60 others.

The violence comes on the heels of last week's government storming of a radical mosque in the capital, Islamabad, a clash that left more than 100 people dead.

On Sunday, militants in North Waziristan, one of the tribal areas, announced they were scrapping a 10-month-old cease-fire accord with the government. That deal was already in tatters and had been widely criticized since its inception, but the militants' decision to end it indicated they wanted no impediment to an all-out fight with government forces.

The turmoil has heightened speculation that Musharraf, who is also the chief of Pakistan's military, might cite the growing threat posed by militants as justification for declaring a state of emergency and putting off elections scheduled for this year.

Before the mosque raid, Musharraf had been under pressure from a grass-roots democracy movement to renounce his army post and allow free and fair balloting. But public sentiment indicated support for his decision to use force on those holed up inside the mosque, which had become the center of a vigilante-style, anti-vice campaign.

That support has given the Pakistani leader something of a respite from the previous political crisis, but it also plunged him into what is shaping up as his government's most serious confrontation in years with militant groups. The groups have enjoyed the longtime patronage of Pakistan's intelligence establishment although Musharraf aligned his government with the United States after the Sept. 11 attacks.

Islamic militant groups, most of them based in the lawless region bordering Afghanistan, have vowed to avenge the assault on the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque.

But the frontier zone has long been the focus of U.S. intelligence concerns about the regrouping and rearming of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements.

The Bush administration, which has expressed support for Musharraf during the mosque raid and months of democracy protests, offered new backing Sunday on his deployment of thousands of troops in and near the tribal areas.

"We are supporting that effort to get control of the situation," national security advisor Stephen Hadley said on ABC's "This Week," citing the threat posed by militants who find sanctuary in the borderlands.

Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden praised "martyrdom" in a video posted on a militant website over the weekend.

The attack on the recruitment center occurred in Dera Ismail Khan in North-West Frontier Province, which borders the South Waziristan tribal region, also a militant stronghold. The police are in the midst of a recruiting drive, and witnesses said the center was packed with job applicants taking written examinations and having medical checkups.

Trouble had been expected in Dera Ismail Khan, where three would-be suicide bombing suspects were arrested Friday. Authorities also seized an explosives-laden car.

The powerful explosion left the recruiting center's main reception area littered with charred corpses and groaning wounded. About half the dead were police officers and the remainder new recruits, authorities said.

Militants on Sunday issued fresh threats against police in the tribal areas, ordering them not to cooperate with the thousands of army and paramilitary forces deployed in the border zone after the Red Mosque raid.

Hours before the attack on the recruitment center, militants staged a sophisticated, multi-pronged assault on a military convoy traveling in the mountainous district of Swat, which lies in the North-West Frontier Province. The province also borders Afghanistan.

The convoy was hit near the town of Matta by two suicide bombers and a roadside bomb, military officials said. At least 18 people were killed and 48 hurt, including about seven civilians.

The force of the explosion shattered vehicles and destroyed half a dozen homes. Television footage showed bloodstained helmets amid the wreckage.

Security forces sealed off the area. Helicopter gunships hovered overhead, and residents said sporadic firing continued for hours afterward.

Until recently, the Swat district had been relatively quiet even though it was known to be a base for forces aligned with a radical mullah, Maulana Fazlullah. The militant leader, speaking Sunday on an illegally operated radio station, said he was going into hiding.

After the mosque raid, he had called on followers to wage war against the government.

The convoy attack was the second in as many days in the frontier zone. On Saturday, at least 26 soldiers were killed and more than 50 hurt in a suicide attack on their convoy north of Miram Shah, the main town in the North Waziristan tribal area.

Under the now-defunct truce between the government and tribal elders in North Waziristan, the Pakistani army had pulled troops back to their barracks. In exchange, the militants were supposed to have halted cross-border attacks against foreign troops in Afghanistan and also to have expelled foreign militants in their midst, but they failed to do so.

Militants had given government forces until Sunday to withdraw from several newly reestablished checkpoints in the Waziristan region, but that demand went unheeded.

Musharraf was accused by critics at home and abroad of appeasing the militants with the pact. However, there were indications his administration might try to negotiate another accord.

The government called a jirga, or conference, for today in Peshawar, the provincial capital. Tribal elders, senior clerics and government officials were to attend.

king@latimes.com

Aid to Pakistan in Tribal Areas Raises Concerns

By JANE PERLEZ

GHALANAI, Pakistan — The United States plans to pour $750 million of aid into Pakistan’s tribal areas over the next five years as part of a “hearts and minds” campaign to win over this lawless region from Qaeda and Taliban militants.

But even before the plan has been fully carried out, documents and officials involved in the planning are warning of the dangers of distributing so much money in an area so hostile that oversight is impossible, even by Pakistan’s own government, which faces rising threats from Islamic militants.

Who will be given the aid has quickly become one of the most contentious questions between local officials and American planners concerned that millions might fall into the wrong hands. The local political agents and tribal chiefs in this hinterland on the Afghan border have for years accommodated the very groups the American and Pakistani governments seek to drive out.

A closely scripted visit to the hospital here, used for a pilot project by the United States Agency for International Development, showed the challenges on full display. The one-story hospital here was virtually empty on a recent day.

Local people had no way to get there. Three of the 110 beds were occupied. Two operating tables had not been used in months. Many doctors had left because the pay was too meager and security too precarious, said Dr. Yusuf Shah, the chief surgeon.

Sher Alam Mahsud, the local political boss who escorted this reporter on a rare visit, said he wanted all the American aid money “delivered to us.” But the precarious security does not allow the Americans to assess the aid priorities firsthand, or to provide oversight for the first installment of $150 million allocated by the Bush administration.

“Delivering $150 million in aid to the tribal areas could very quickly make a few people rich and do almost nothing to provide opportunity and justice to the region,” said Craig Cohen, the author of a recent study of United States-Pakistan relations at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Yet it is here in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, as the region is formally called, that Washington is intent on using the development aid as a counterinsurgency tool, according to a draft of the Agency for International Development plan given to The New York Times by an official who worked on it.

The draft warns that the “severe governance deficiencies” in the tribal areas will make it virtually impossible for the aid to be sustainable or to overcome the “area’s chronic underdevelopment and consequent volatility.”

The ambitious plan was publicly highlighted during a visit to Pakistan in June by Richard A. Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, as a measure of Washington’s support for Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

“The objective driving this decision is the hope that by bringing the FATA into the mainstream and assuring that basic human services and infrastructure are on par with the rest of Pakistan, the people of FATA would be less likely to welcome the presence of Al Qaeda and Taliban,” the draft states. The projects include health and education services, water and sanitation facilities, and agricultural development, it says, making clear that these are a means to a broader end. “The main goal of the United States government in relation to the FATA is counterterrorism,” it says.

One way to improve the chances of the aid’s efficacy would be greater emphasis on political reform in the tribal areas, according to the draft. The Pakistani government has created a panel to study reform of the political structure in the areas, the draft noted, adding that “Usaid should explore opportunities for contributing its substantial experience in local government capacity building to any reform efforts the government of Pakistan decide to undertake.”

Even if the tribal areas were not under the sway of the Taliban, which they increasingly are, the development challenge here would be steep enough, the document and interviews make clear.

The area, home to 3.2 million people, remains a desolate landscape where women are strictly veiled. Female literacy — at 3 percent — is among the lowest in the world. Schools are often used to run businesses. There is no banking system. Smuggling of opium and other contraband is routine.

The hostility to almost anything that smacks of foreign influence is such that money from the modest development agency program, administered by the charity Save the Children at the hospital here, was being delivered anonymously, undercutting any potential public relations benefit for the United States.

“We can’t do branding,” said Fayyaz Ali Khan, the program manager for Save the Children, in an interview in the city of Peshawar. “Usually we say the aid comes from the American people, but here we can’t.”

Suspicions about modern medicine are rife. A Pakistani doctor was blown up in his car in June after trying to counter the anti-vaccine propaganda of an imam in Bajaur, one of the tribal agencies, Pakistani officials said.

The Pakistani government has virtually no authority here. After years of fighting to assert its authority, at the cost of about 600 soldiers, it negotiated peace accords with tribal authorities that have all but confined Pakistani troops to their barracks.

Tribal elders, local imams and governors known as political agents — their title goes back to the British colonial days — are the on-the-ground arbiters of all decisions in many districts. The political agents are widely considered corrupt.

A senior American official in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, who would not speak for attribution, defended the plan’s goals as necessary and achievable. The official said that “Pakistani firms, consulting organizations and nongovernmental organizations” would be the main deliverers of the assistance.

The official said, referring to the international aid agency, that these would in turn be “managed under Usaid direct contracts and grants to American and international organizations.”

Mr. Cohen, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was skeptical. Almost every potential recipient of the money was suspect in the eyes of the people it was supposed to help, he said. “The notion that there’s going to be $150 million a year to Pakistani nongovernmental organizations who are going to be out in the open seems naïve to me,” he said.

“The insecurity of the area will require a heavy reliance on local partners” like Pakistani nongovernmental organizations to administer projects, he added. “But the nongovernmental organizations don’t trust the military, the military doesn’t trust the tribal chiefs, and the tribal chiefs won’t trust us unless they’re getting a cut of the money.”

Such Pakistani groups were often targets of the Islamic militants in the tribal areas. The militants are increasingly destroying CD shops and attacking small efforts to gain advantages for women.

Mr. Mahsud, the political agent for the tribal agency, or district, of Mohmand, where the hospital is, had his own ideas. Any aid money from Western donors should be “pooled here,” he said, during an interview at the FATA secretariat headquarters in Peshawar, meaning it should be distributed through local officials.

His power was evident when he drove in his impressive new four-wheel-drive vehicle through the heavy metal black gates that mark the boundary to his tribal agency. Armed men in heavy gray uniforms, wearing black felt berets in the summer heat, snapped to attention.

The hospital itself was barren, and silent. Dr. Shah, the chief surgeon, and other doctors who had come to the hospital for the visit of an outsider, said water was a luxury trucked in by tanker, arriving at best every other day.

One doctor, Aaquila Khan, brimmed with passion about helping the poor and feeble women who came to visit the woefully underequipped hospital, but she lives in Peshawar, more than an hour’s drive away, and so comes in just two or three days a week, mornings only, to treat those female patients.

“They are very much anemic,” she said of eight women she treated during a recent visit. “They are not educated, they are not aware of family planning, they have no money.” Only the women living within walking distance could come, she said.

The aid program run by Save the Children, a small $11 million starter project that hints at the bigger things planned by the Americans, formally began last December with a signing of a memorandum of understanding with the tribal authorities.

The idea is for Pakistani doctors to train health care workers who will go into the field and train traditional health assistants on more modern methods.

But the first training sessions have only just begun, said Mr. Khan, the program manager for Save the Children. The only sign of the program was a “resource room” with a large blond wood table and a dozen or so chairs still in their plastic wrapping.

The training sessions take place in Peshawar, over the tribal boundary, to ensure the safety of the doctors.

Bush again links Iraq war to Al Qaeda

From a Times Staff Writer

July 11, 2007

By describing the U.S. effort in Iraq largely as a struggle against Al Qaeda, President Bush on Tuesday reached for a familiar — but widely questioned — way of defining the war.

"The same people that attacked us on September the 11th is a crowd that is now bombing people" in Iraq, Bush said. "The killers who came to America have said, with clarity, we want you out of Iraq so we can have a safe haven from which to attack again."

Bush's remarks echoed an administration effort to establish links between the Al Qaeda terrorist network and Iraq that began before the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.

Insurgents affiliated with the group that calls itself Al Qaeda in Iraq have been involved in many attacks in that country. But the CIA, Pentagon and other experts have debated the group's role in Iraq and its ties to Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is one of several Sunni Muslim insurgent groups. U.S. and Iraqi officials have blamed it for many high-profile attacks. A Pentagon report late last year, however, said that Shiite Muslim militias, not Al Qaeda, were the largest threat to security in Iraq.

The connection between the group in Iraq and Bin Laden's network, which is based along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier, is unclear. Abu Musab Zarqawi, the late leader of the group that became known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, had operated independently. He drew criticism from Al Qaeda for his bloody tactics.

An authoritative intelligence report in February predicted that Al Qaeda would attempt to use parts of Iraq to plan and launch attacks abroad if the U.S. were to withdraw. But the report did not indicate that intelligence experts believe Iraq will become an Al Qaeda sanctuary.

U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda Chiefs in Pakistan in 2005

By MARK MAZZETTI

WASHINGTON, July 7 — A secret military operation in early 2005 to capture senior members of Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas was aborted at the last minute after top Bush administration officials decided it was too risky and could jeopardize relations with Pakistan, according to intelligence and military officials.

The target was a meeting of Qaeda leaders that intelligence officials thought included Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden’s top deputy and the man believed to run the terrorist group’s operations.

But the mission was called off after Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, rejected an 11th-hour appeal by Porter J. Goss, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, officials said. Members of a Navy Seals unit in parachute gear had already boarded C-130 cargo planes in Afghanistan when the mission was canceled, said a former senior intelligence official involved in the planning.

Mr. Rumsfeld decided that the operation, which had ballooned from a small number of military personnel and C.I.A. operatives to several hundred, was cumbersome and put too many American lives at risk, the current and former officials said. He was also concerned that it could cause a rift with Pakistan, an often reluctant ally that has barred the American military from operating in its tribal areas, the officials said.

The decision to halt the planned “snatch and grab” operation frustrated some top intelligence officials and members of the military’s secret Special Operations units, who say the United States missed a significant opportunity to try to capture senior members of Al Qaeda.

Their frustration has only grown over the past two years, they said, as Al Qaeda has improved its abilities to plan global attacks and build new training compounds in Pakistan’s tribal areas, which have become virtual havens for the terrorist network.

In recent months, the White House has become increasingly irritated with Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for his inaction on the growing threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

About a dozen current and former military and intelligence officials were interviewed for this article, all of whom requested anonymity because the planned 2005 mission remained classified.

Spokesmen for the Pentagon, the C.I.A. and the White House declined to comment. It is unclear whether President Bush was informed about the planned operation.

The officials acknowledge that they are not certain that Mr. Zawahri attended the 2005 meeting in North Waziristan, a mountainous province just miles from the Afghan border. But they said that the United States had communications intercepts that tipped them off to the meeting, and that intelligence officials had unusually high confidence that Mr. Zawahri was there.

Months later, in early May 2005, the C.I.A. launched a missile from a remotely piloted Predator drone, killing Haitham al-Yemeni, a senior Qaeda figure whom the C.I.A. had tracked since the meeting.

It has long been known that C.I.A. operatives conduct counterterrorism missions in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Details of the aborted 2005 operation provide a glimpse into the Bush administration’s internal negotiations over whether to take unilateral military action in Pakistan, where General Musharraf’s fragile government is under pressure from dissidents who object to any cooperation with the United States.

Pentagon officials familiar with covert operations said that planners had to consider the political and human risks of undertaking a military campaign in a sovereign country, even in an area like Pakistan’s tribal lands, where the government has only tenuous control. Even with its shortcomings, Pakistan has been a vital American ally since the Sept. 11 attacks, and the militaries of the two countries have close ties.

The Pentagon officials said tension was inherent in any decision to approve such a mission: a smaller military footprint allows a better chance of a mission going undetected, but it also exposes the units to greater risk of being killed or captured.

Officials said one reason Mr. Rumsfeld called off the 2005 operation was that the number of troops involved in the mission had grown to several hundred, including Army Rangers, members of the Navy Seals and C.I.A. operatives, and he determined that the United States could no longer carry out the mission without General Musharraf’s permission. It is unlikely that the Pakistani president would have approved an operation of that size, officials said.

Some outside experts said American counterterrorism operations had been hamstrung because of concerns about General Musharraf’s shaky government.

“The reluctance to take risk or jeopardize our political relationship with Musharraf may well account for the fact that five and half years after 9/11 we are still trying to run bin Laden and Zawahri to ground,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University.

Those political considerations have created resentment among some members of the military’s Special Operations forces.

“The Special Operations guys are tearing their hair out at the highest levels,” said a former Bush administration official with close ties to those troops. While they have not received good intelligence on the whereabouts of top Qaeda members recently, he said, they say they believe they have sometimes had useful information on lower-level figures.

“There is a degree of frustration that is off the charts, because they are looking at targets on a daily basis and can’t move against them,” he said.

In early 2005, after learning about the Qaeda meeting, the military developed a plan for a small Navy Seals unit to parachute into Pakistan to carry out a quick operation, former officials said.

But as the operation moved up the military chain of command, officials said, various planners bulked up the force’s size to provide security for the Special Operations forces.

“The whole thing turned into the invasion of Pakistan,” said the former senior intelligence official involved in the planning. Still, he said he thought the mission was worth the risk. “We were frustrated because we wanted to take a shot,” he said.

Several former officials interviewed said the operation was not the only occasion since the Sept. 11 attacks that plans were developed to use a large American military force in Pakistan. It is unclear whether any of those missions have been executed.

Some of the military and intelligence officials familiar with the 2005 events say it showed a rift between operators in the field and a military bureaucracy that has still not effectively adapted to hunt for global terrorists, moving too cautiously to use Special Operations troops against terrorist targets.

That criticism has echoes of the risk aversion that the officials said pervaded efforts against Al Qaeda during the Clinton administration, when missions to use American troops to capture or kill Mr. bin Laden in Afghanistan were never executed because they were considered too perilous, risked killing civilians or were based on inadequate intelligence. Rather than sending in ground troops, the Clinton White House instead chose to fire cruise missiles in what became failed attempts to kill Mr. bin Laden and his deputies — a tactic Mr. Bush criticized shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks.

Since then, the C.I.A. has launched missiles from Predator aircraft in the tribal areas several times, with varying degrees of success. Intelligence officials say they believe that in January 2006, an airstrike narrowly missed killing Mr. Zawahri, who hours earlier had attended a dinner in Damadola, a Pakistani village.

General Musharraf cast his lot with the Bush administration in the hunt for Al Qaeda after the 2001 attacks, and he has periodically ordered Pakistan’s military to conduct counterterrorism missions in the tribal areas, provoking fierce resistance there. But in recent months he has pulled back, prompting Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to issue stern warnings in private that he risked losing American aid if he did not step up efforts against Al Qaeda, senior administration officials have said.

Officials said that mid-2005 was a period when they were gathering good intelligence about Al Qaeda’s leaders in Pakistan’s tribal areas. By the next year, however, the White House had become frustrated by the lack of progress in the hunt for Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri.

In early 2006, President Bush ordered a “surge” of dozens of C.I.A. agents to Pakistan, hoping that an influx of intelligence operatives would lead to better information, officials said. But that has brought the United States no closer to locating Al Qaeda’s top two leaders. The latest message from them came this week, in a new tape in which Mr. Zawahri urged Iraqis and Muslims around the world to show more support for Islamist insurgents in Iraq.

In his recently published memoir, George J. Tenet, the former C.I.A. director, said the intelligence about Mr. bin Laden’s whereabouts during the Clinton years was similarly sparse. The information was usually only at the “50-60% confidence level,” he wrote, not sufficient to justify American military action.

“As much as we all wanted Bin Ladin dead, the use of force by a superpower requires information, discipline, and time,” Mr. Tenet wrote. “We rarely had the information in sufficient quantities or the time to evaluate and act on it.”