Dealing With the Devil

"The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists," he said. "And that is why we are on the offense. And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own. Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.

President George W. Bush

But what if the only Iraqis that stand up against Al Qaeda are anti-American fighters themselves?

For U.S. Unit in Baghdad, An Alliance of Last Resort

By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, June 9, 2007; A01

BAGHDAD, June 8 -- The worst month of Lt. Col. Dale Kuehl's deployment in western Baghdad was finally drawing to a close. The insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq had unleashed bombings that killed 14 of his soldiers in May, a shocking escalation of violence for a battalion that had lost three soldiers in the previous six months while patrolling the Sunni enclave of Amiriyah. On top of that, the 41-year-old battalion commander was doubled up with a stomach flu when, late on May 29, he received a cellphone call that would change everything.

"We're going after al-Qaeda," a leading local imam said, Kuehl recalled. "What we want you to do is stay out of the way."

"Sheik, I can't do that. I can't just leave Amiriyah and let you go at it."

"Well, we're going to go."

The week that followed revolutionized Kuehl's approach to fighting the insurgency and serves as a vivid example of a risky, and expanding, new American strategy of looking beyond the Iraqi police and army for help in controlling violent neighborhoods. The American soldiers in Amiriyah have allied themselves with dozens of Sunni militiamen who call themselves the Baghdad Patriots -- a group that American soldiers believe includes insurgents who have attacked them in the past -- in an attempt to drive out al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Americans have granted these gunmen the power of arrest, allowed the Iraqi army to supply them with ammunition, and fought alongside them in chaotic street battles.

To many American soldiers in Amiriyah, this nascent allegiance stands out as an encouraging development after months of grinding struggle. They liken the fighters to the minutemen of the American Revolution, painting them as neighbors taking the initiative to protect their families in the vacuum left by a failing Iraqi security force. In their first week of collaboration, the Baghdad Patriots and the Americans killed roughly 10 suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq members and captured 15, according to Kuehl, who said those numbers rivaled totals for the previous six months combined. He is now working to fashion the group into the beginnings of an Amiriyah police force, since the mainly Shiite police force refuses to work in the area.

"This is a defining moment for us," said Kuehl, who commands the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, attached to the 1st Infantry Division.

But aligning Americans with fighters whose long-term agenda remains unclear -- with regard to either Americans or the Shiite-led government -- is also a strategy born of desperation. It contradicts repeated declarations by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that no groups besides the Iraqi and American security forces are allowed to bear arms. And some American soldiers worry that standing up a Sunni militia could have dire consequences if the group turns on its U.S. partners.

"We have made a deal with the devil," said an intelligence officer in the battalion.

The U.S. effort to recruit indigenous forces to defend local communities has been taken furthest in Anbar province, where tribal leaders have encouraged thousands of their kinsmen to join the police. In the Abu Ghraib area, west of Baghdad, about 2,000 people unaffiliated with security forces are now working with Americans at village checkpoints and gun positions.

Kuehl said he recognizes the risks in dealing with an unofficial force but decided the intelligence that the gunmen provided on al-Qaeda in Iraq was too valuable to pass up.

"Hell, nothing else has worked in Amiriyah," he said.

It was about 2 a.m. on May 30 when Capt. Andy Wilbraham, a 33-year-old company commander, first heard military chatter on his tank radio about rumors that local gunmen would take on al-Qaeda. Later that morning, a noncommissioned officer turned to him with the news: "They're uprising."

"It was just a shock it happened so fast," Wilbraham said.

By noon, loudspeakers in mosques throughout Amiriyah were broadcasting a call to war: "It is time to stand up and fight" al-Qaeda. Groups of men, some in black ski masks carrying AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, descended on the area around the Maluki mosque, a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq base of operations, and launched an attack. For the most part, Kuehl's soldiers stood back, trying to contain the violence and secure other mosques, and let the gunmen do their work.

The next day, a Thursday, al-Qaeda counterattacked. Using machine guns and grenades, its fighters drove the militiamen south across several city blocks until they were holed up in the Firdas mosque, soldiers said. "I was getting reports every 10 minutes from one of the imams: 'They're at this point. We're surrounded. We're getting attacked. They're at the mosque,' " Kuehl recalled. He dispatched Stryker attack vehicles to protect the militiamen.

"We basically pushed that one back just by force," said Capt. Kevin Salge, 31, who led the Stryker team of about 60 men to the mosque. "We got in there. Our guns are much bigger guns. Then freedom fighters, Baghdad Patriot guys, started firing."

Spec. Chadrick Domino, 23, was with a Stryker unit that drove north of the mosque to set up a perimeter to prevent others from joining the fight. About noon, he was the first member of his team to walk into a residential courtyard. He may not have had time to see the machine gunner who killed him.

To the Americans, the fighters on both sides appeared nearly identical. They wore similar sweat suits and carried the same kind of machine guns. "Now we've got kind of a mess on our hands," Salge remembered thinking. "Because we've got a lot of armed guys running all over the place, and it's making it very hard for us to identify which side is which."

By afternoon, the Americans had secured the Firdas mosque and were helping treat the wounded who lay in the courtyard. Kuehl drove out from his headquarters to meet with the leaders of the militiamen and work out the terms that would guide their collaboration in coming days. Kuehl agreed to help if the militiamen did not torture their captives or kill people who were not affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq. The militiamen agreed to hold prisoners for no more than 24 hours before releasing them or handing them over to the Americans. They in turn wanted the Americans not to interfere and to provide weapons.

"We need them and they need us," Kuehl said. "Al-Qaeda's stronger than them. We provide capabilities that they don't have. And the locals know who belongs and who doesn't. It doesn't matter how long we're here, I'll never know. And we'll never fit in."

The militiamen, who call themselves freedom fighters, are led by a 35-year-old former Iraqi army captain and used-car salesman who goes by Saif or Abu Abed. In an interview, he said he had devoted the past five months to collecting intelligence on al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters in Amiriyah, whose ranks have grown as they have fled to Baghdad and away from the new tribal policemen in Anbar province. He has said his own group numbers over 100 people, but American soldiers estimate it has closer to 40. At least six were killed and more than 10 wounded in the first week of collaboration with Americans.

"These guys looked like a military unit, the way they moved," Wilbraham said. "Hand and arm signals. Stop. Take a knee. Weapons up."

Ali Hatem Ali Suleiman, a leader of the Sunni Dulaimi tribe who works in Anbar and Baghdad, said many of the fighters in Amiriyah belong to the Islamic Army, which includes former officers from Saddam Hussein's military and is more secular than other insurgent groups. The fighters have been organized and encouraged by local imams.

"Let's be honest, the enemy now is not the Americans, for the time being," Suleiman said. "It's al-Qaeda and the [Shiite] militias. Those are our enemies."

The American soldiers initially asked their new allies to wear white headbands and ride around in the Strykers to point out al-Qaeda households. But the joint patrols didn't work because the local fighters were disoriented after riding in the enclosed Strykers and couldn't find the right houses, Salge said.

Before long, he added, "people everywhere were wearing headbands, and I'm pretty sure that a lot of them were al-Qaeda."

The Americans then supplied reflective armbands that could be seen from their vehicle scopes, and had the fighters ride in Iraqi army Humvees instead of Strykers. They also gave the fighters plastic flex cuffs, to subdue captives, and flares -- red to use if they are in trouble and green to signal when a raid is over.

On June 1, a Friday, the fighters directed the soldiers to a large weapons cache. Sniper rifles, Russian machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and thousands of rounds of ammunition were stashed in a secret room, accessible only by removing a circuit-breaker box and crawling through a hole. While the Americans were tallying the haul, an explosive detonated outside, wounding several soldiers, including one whose feet were blown off.

In return for their services, the militiamen had one request: Give us the weapons in the cache.

"Who are these guys really?" Salge remembered worrying. He told them to talk to the battalion commander.

Kuehl said later that he would probably supply weapons to the militiamen, but in limited amounts. The fighters have given the Americans identification, including fingerprints, addresses and retinal scans, so the soldiers believe they could track down anyone who betrayed them. "What I don't want them to do is wither on the vine," Kuehl said.

On Wednesday, a week after the fighting broke out, the Islamic Army issued a statement declaring a cease-fire with al-Qaeda in Iraq because the groups did not want to spill more Muslim blood or impede "the project of jihad." American soldiers played down the statement and suggested it did not reflect the sentiments of the men they are working with in Amiriyah.

Later that night, Wilbraham led his tank unit on an overnight mission to allow the militiamen to arrest seven al-Qaeda in Iraq members. The raids were to begin at 1 a.m., but two hours later the tanks were waiting on deserted streets, with no sign of the group. Then Wilbraham was told the militiamen had called off the raids.

The tank driver, Spec. Estevan Altamirano, 25, expressed skepticism about his new partners.

"Pretty soon they run out of al-Qaeda, and then they're going to turn on us," he said. "I don't want to get used to them and then I have an AK behind my back. I'm not going to trust them at all."

Repeat: This is NOT a Hostage Exchange, This is NOT a Hostage Exchange

The U.S. government has been holding five Iranians that the Iranian government says are "diplomats" since they were captured near Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan in January.

In what was probably an attempt to get the five released, Iran's IRGC captured a British naval crew and held them for 13 days in March-April of this year.

More recently, Iran's government seized four Iranian-Americans visiting Iran and has charged them with spying or other anti-regime crimes.

Now several U.S. officials have indicated that the U.S. will very likely release the five Iranians. This will probably depend on what tone comes out of Tehran in response.

Remember, this is not a hostage exchange. I repeat, this is not a hostage exchange.

Reports of Turkish Incursions into Iraq

Today, there were several reports of Turkish military incursions into northern Iraqi Kurdistan to attack PKK guerrillas.

The reports were denied by relevant government officials in Iraq, Turkey, and the United States. Its only sources appear to have been anonymous senior Turkish military officials. However, reports were repeatedly made throughout the day, and indicated that hundreds of Turkish soldiers had raided the country in "hot pursuit" of Kurdish terrorists.

Whether true or not, tensions in Turkey over attacks by Kurdish terrorists based in Iraq have been very high, and as many as 250,000 Turkish troops have been massed just across the border from Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey has frequently threatened to act in Iraq, but not like this.

The United States has been pushing Iraqi Kurds to do something about the PKK's occupation of a slice of territory just across from Turkey. Turkey is trying very hard to insinuate, whether by raiding Iraq or by raising that possibility through the press, that a Turkish attack is likely if the PKK is not dealt with, and soon.

If Turkey was to invade Iraq and remain engaged militarily against the Kurds in northern Iraq, that would be a serious crisis in a region that has been a bright spot in an unpopular American war in Iraq. Seeing Turkish soldiers killed by Kurds, with little done by Americans -- a strong possibility in such a situation -- would harden Turkish public opinion against the United States, and harm an otherwise moderate officially secular Muslim state. In short, it would be a Middle East-wide disaster.

Iraq Appropriations Politics

This Fall, Democrats in Congress will finally get their say on Iraq.

President Bush recently got what he wanted -- a timetable removed from an Iraq emergency supplemental appropriations bill. Democrats fought for timetables and sure benchmarks. They ultimately caved, leaving many rank-and-file Democrats terribly angry.

The results of November's Congressional elections, if anything, were meant to cause a change in Iraq policy on Capitol Hill. That the House and Senate would give President Bush all of the funding he needs to conduct the war exactly how he wants without any binding requirements was a big blow

But the fight for the emergency appropriations bill is nothing in comparison to what's going to happen when the real, regular Iraq appropriations bill comes up this September

In September, General Petraeus has promised a report on the results of this summer's surge. And Petraeus and the Bush Administration have said that they'll determine what to do with U.S. involvement in Iraq based on the results of this report.

But recent news reflects clearly that the surge isn't saving Baghdad, and the American forces in Iraq can't really change the general dynamic of civil war there.

So it's no surprise that General Odierno is saying that it's going to take more time to issue the report. And no surprise that today Ambassador Crocker would say that it will take a lot longer than September to see results in Iraq.

Of course, you could wait forever for positive results in Iraq without seeing any, but that's beside the point. We're talking about September's appropriations bill for next year's war operations.

No amount of spin or attempting to recast the debate can get the President out of asking Congress for money. And he's going to have to ask around September in order to actually have the appropriations process work.

Without magnificent success to show for the surge, the President is going to have to announce a significant change of course in Iraq. A few different initiatives have been floated -- a 50% cut in troops in Iraq during 2008, and an endorsement of the Baker-Hamilton Report. President

As much as the President didn't agree with the results of the Iraq Study Group Report, it doesn't require the President to do much besides attempt to engage Iraq's neighbors in dialogue. A dialogue that can be ongoing, fruitlessly, while the President stays the course, with a little window-dressing, in Iraq. And don't forget, the Iraq Study Group explicitly did not include any timelines in their Report.

Let's say what it really is: President Bush's "endorsement" of the Iraq Study Group's recommendations would be a transparent play for time. So I believe this will be the core of what President Bush will propose along with his request for war funding this Fall.

Democrats in Congress cannot be satisfied with an Administration that simply states that it will adhere by the terms of the Baker-Hamilton Report. Letting the Administration off without more would damage their own credibility and truly alienate the Democratic base.

The Democrats will include a harsh timetable, one with teeth, in September. They will limit the President's license to carry out the war. And they will take steps that will lead to a drawdown in U.S. forces in Iraq. The need for money to continue the war, and Democrats' unwillingness to give it without strings, means that the President will have to accept changes. The only question is whether these changes will be entirely on his initiative or not. And based on the President's lack of creativity in Iraq policy, the answer will be "not."

The other alternative being floated -- a 50% cut in U.S. forces during 2008 -- reflects not what the President wants but what he will likely have to accept. Floating this idea is only the President looking forward to 2008 and trying not to look like he was politically defeated. It is not a positive initiative to win the war.

In light of the situation that will likely exist in September, the question for Democrats should be, "what conditions should we place on the President's conduct of the war in Iraq," and "what is the right way to withdraw the large majority of American forces from Iraq during 2008 and possibly 2009?"

These are difficult questions that must be taken very seriously. Up to this point, posturing and posing on Capitol Hill has been no problem because in the end everyone knew that Congress wasn't going to upset the war-funding applecart. This time, however, Congress is likely to get most of what it asks for.

UNMOVIC Still Looking for Iraq's Weapons

Why?

Because Russia won't let the U.S. get away with declaring that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction without having a UN team review all the United States' intelligence on the subject. Presumably with full Russian access to said intelligence.

Four of Five Kidnapped Britons Were Bodyguards

What I hadn't noticed from the capture of a group of five Britons in Baghdad was that four of them were bodyguards for the fifth, a consultant coming to speak at an Iraqi ministry.

That is to say, as a small but effective security detail, these four presumably could have taken on a typical kidnapping and possibly prevented their own capture. That the believed Shiite militia that captured them sent dozens of men in official Iraqi Police uniforms and SUVs to where this foreigner was indicates to me that the ministry he had gone to speak was infiltrated by militias willing to tip them of his presence.

This was clearly a Shiite militia action, to have that kind of equipment and access. I think that these men's captors were a splinter Mahdi Army faction who feared being sold out by Moqtada Al Sadr as he consolidates his national position in Iraq and within the political and military operation that bears his name.

For followers under his direct control would be a risk to Sadr with no clear return. However, for splinter groups at risk from Sadr discipline, kidnapping Western captives might be a way of ensuring security, like Iran's attempts to gain nuclear weapons.

Something to Watch For:

The emergence of Al Qaeda-inspired jihadist groups in Gaza.

After BBC reporter David Johnston was captured by a "shadowy" group called the Army of Islam, everyone said, "who?" It appears that in addition to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Army if Islam might be one of a number of emerging groups supporting global jihad in the Palestinian territories, and Gaza in particular.

If Hamas remains in government, that may leave room for more radical groups to claim their slice of Gaza's angry young men.

Iraqis Fighting Al Qaeda

Leave it to Iraq's true "armed forces," the insurgents battling across Iraq's Sunni-Shia divide, to take on Al Qaeda. Lord knows, the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police sure haven't been successful.

This battle is one of many that has gone on across Iraq, between local sectarian or tribal-based militias and the fanatically indiscriminate Al Qaeda or related groups like the Islamic State of Iraq.

I'm certain that the Bush Administration will hype this kind of thing in its favor when it has to state its case for continuing the war this Fall. How far we have fallen. Supporting one private army against another in Iraq is an element of victory?

Iran Now Successfully Enriching Uranium

It wasn't long ago that everyone was concerned about Iran's ability to produce enriched uranium and barely hidden desire to build nuclear weapons.

But then Iran overplayed its hand. It celebrated its nuclear weapons program while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran's centrifuges weren't working. The international community coalesced around a restrictive and negative position toward Iran's nuclear weapons program. And everyone who said Iran was going to have a nuke in five years took it back. Everyone thought, well, we were wrong about Saddam, why not be cautious about Iran?

Well, the IAEA reminded us today that these situations do not simply remain static. According to IAEA inspectors, Iran has now surmounted major enrichment obstacles and has greatly increased its nuclear production, placing Iran on a path to weapon-building capacity sooner than previously expected.

It just goes to show that early action in the proliferation sphere is critically, critically, important to limiting the spread of nuclear technology and materials. It has taken the world this long to get this far. At this rate, Iran will be able to build a bomb before the world can do anything about it.

Foreign Affairs: Withdraw from Iraq

I have written before that it seemed that Foreign Affairs, the premier large-circulation magazine of international relations in the United States has turned against the war.

This article, in March's issue but available online, says that the war in Iraq is definitely a civil war and that the best U.S. option is to withdraw from the central fighting:

If the Bush administration sticks to its "stay the course toward victory" approach, of which the surge option is the latest incarnation, it will become increasingly apparent that this policy amounts to siding with the Shiites in an extremely vicious Sunni-Shiite war. U.S. troops may play some positive role in preventing human rights abuses by Iraqi army units and slowing down violence and ethnic cleansing. But as long as the United States remains committed to trying to make this Iraqi government "succeed" on the terms President Bush has laid out, there is no escaping the fact that the central function of U.S. troops will be to backstop Maliki's government or its successor. That security gives Maliki and his coalition the ability to tacitly pursue (or acquiesce in) a dirty war against actual and imagined Sunni antagonists while publicly supporting "national reconciliation."

This policy is hard to defend on the grounds of either morality or national interest. Even if Shiite thugs and their facilitators in the government could succeed in ridding Baghdad of Sunnis, it is highly unlikely that they would be able to suppress the insurgency in the Sunni-majority provinces in western Iraq or to prevent attacks in Baghdad and other places where Shiites live. In other words, the current U.S. policy probably will not lead to a decisive military victory anytime soon, if ever. And even if it did, would Washington want it to? The rise of a brutal, ethnically exclusivist, Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad would further the perception of Iran as the ascendant regional power. Moreover, U.S. backing for such a government would give Iraqi Sunnis and the Sunni-dominated countries in the Middle East no reason not to support al Qaeda as an ally in Iraq. By spurring these states to support Sunni forces fighting the Shiite government, such backing would ultimately pit the United States against those states in a proxy war.

Fearon's argument certainly sounds like things I've heard a number of other places, but now that it is being placed, without counterpoint, in Foreign Affairs, indicates just how the editors of that magazine think about the war in Iraq.

Anyway, as for the actual merits of the article, they are many. It has an interesting comparison to urban left-right and group-based gang/militia fighting in Turkey in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but says that the powerful Turkish military was able to end that fighting in ways the United States cannot in Iraq.

The article also highlights the Iraq Study Group's finding that partition (the Biden solution to Iraq) is likely a bloody, pointless non-starter.

The article is worth a read, and if you have the time, very interesting.

The Musa Qala Problem

The Afghan government, its NATO allies, and Pakistan all face the same problem.

They want to let pushtun Afghan and Waziristan local governments rule themselves. In a way, they have to because Afghan, Pakistani and NATO really can't control the countryside. National authorities just don't have the numbers or local support to do it.

But the local authorities, well-intentioned as they may (or may not) be, cannot compete with the power of the Taliban. And as a result, deals like those made in Waziristan or Musa Qala in Afghanistan, under which Afghan, NATO and Pakistani forces leave areas and local elders take over, just cannot succeed. Taliban forces come in, take over, and then state-sanctioned national authorities have to use bombings and rough tactics to take the area back.

Based on the local conditions and numbers of troops, these types of deals are pretty predictable. But based on the way these local turnovers have turned out, they seem like predictably bad ideas.

Black Hawk Down Redux

Seized documents purportedly from Al Qaeda in Iraq show that attacks on American helicopters are part of a coordinated strategy in Iraq.

In Mogadishu, Somali militias opposed to American attacks knew the lesson of Vietnam. If you can inflict casualties on American forces and a military action will become unpopular, and end. Somali put this lesson to vivid effect by downing American helicopters in October 1993 and bringing an end to the U.S. mission in Somalia.

Al Qaeda in Iraq appears to have learned the lesson of Somalia -- if you can down American helicopters and show the American public that you are doing it, you will shake U.S. military efforts.

While a new strategy, this looks like a predictable reaction to the way the United States uses helicopters to get around IEDs and support Iraqi and American military operations. It also reflects the aspirations of insurgents and terrorists to attack symbolic targets.

I hope this predictability means the United States will be able to respond effectively. While some attacks on helicopters appear to have succeeded, Americans appear to have responded well to crashes in at least several reported instances. They have moved quickly to protect downed personnel and helicopters. This kind of effective response will keep Iraqi terrorists from having more Black Hawk Down moments.

The Senate's Next Decision

Having failed to invoke cloture on S. 547, the resolution opposing the "surge," Senate Democrats will have to consider whether they will allow some version of Senator Judd Gregg's amendment to support the troops (currently S. 641) to be attached to the Senate resolution.

This amendment would "express the sense of Congress that no funds should be cut off or reduced for American troops in the field which would result in undermining their safety or their ability to complete their assigned missions."

It would be something of a move to forestall the Democrats' next steps toward ending the Iraq war. However, I think that if the Senate moves forward with a vote that includes as a core element the disapproval of President Bush's conduct of the war, Senator Gregg's amendment won't matter.

The general sense of what Senate Democrats have to be able to live with if they are to seek cloture is this: a measure that requires every Senator, in some way, to express whether they support President Bush's conduct of the war. It has to be a vote that doesn't let Republicans say they stand for one part of what they voted on but not another part.

Senate Votes Against Debating Iraq War Resolution

After a difficult, tightly managed debate, the U.S. Senate just voted 56-34 against proceeding to a vote on S. 574, a Senate bill expressing, as the House did, disapproval of a House-passed Iraq war resolution. Democrats tried to move to vote on that measure by invoking cloture on debate, i.e., cutting off Senators' opportunities to filibuster.

In addition to all Senate Democrats, seven Republican Senators - Senators Coleman, Collins, Hagel, Smith, Snowe, Specter, and Warner - voted in favor of the motion.

Ten Republican Senators did not vote and presumably were not present, most notably Senator McCain, who is out trying to run for President. It seems that these Republicans must have been certain that the vote would go their way.

I doubt very much that this will be the last time that Democrats try to push for a similar vote. They've done it before and only got two Republicans. But in the end, if they cannot peel off three more Republican Senators to reach 60, Democrats will never get to a vote on the substance of these crucial measures.

As Senator Schumer said today, this debate and vote would have been the first steps toward eventually ending the war in Iraq. It did not happen today, but I believe this vote was positive.

First, it identified those Republican Senators who will consistently support a move to vote for a resolution of this strength. This allows Democrats to make the next chess moves toward a debate and vote on Iraq. Will Democrats have to take Senator Gregg's desired amendment to "support the troops" into account? To get to 60 votes, Democrats might have to.

Second, it put pressure on Senator McCain to support his position on the war in Iraq. As we move toward the general elections, Senator McCain will have to explain why he did not vote when he supposedly supports the President's plans for increasing troop numbers in Iraq so strongly.

And third, it allowed Democratic Senators to say they are moving the legislative agenda the voters chose in November -- a change of course in Iraq -- into effect. I think they are trying hard, even if it is difficult to move this kind of legislation through the Senate.

The Iraq Syndrome

President Bush claims that a Middle Eastern enemy state is consorting with and giving weapons to terrorists. He says it is developing weapons of mass destruction.

But wait. When some in his Administration make the mistake of tying these actions to the highest levels of the Iranian government, President Bush takes a step back. He says, no, while he is sure that a major power in Iran, the Quds Force, is supplying Shiite militias terrorizing Sunnis in Iraq, he is not certain that Iran's top leaders have sanctioned this.

While the provided facts are similar to the case for war against Iraq -- hazy claims about weapons systems and capabilities along with background briefings aimed at putting Administration claims in the press and swaying politicians and diplomats -- the President is not moving forward on Iran the same way he did with Iraq.

And that, my friends, is what the Washington Post is calling the "Iraq Syndrome", a hesitancy to take intelligence at face value and run with it. A "Baghdad briefer" who goes too far in saying that shaped charges in Iran were put there by Supreme Leader Khamenei is slapped down.

Before the war in Iraq, an important aspect of Bush Administration thinking was that intelligence was insufficient, action was necessary, and that policymakers had to assemble what information they could from the avalanche of data often available from intelligence services.

Now, skepticism of intelligence is leavened with a healthy dose of public skepticism toward policymakers, in particular, toward non-professional high-level ideologues. While international relations and politics students are taught about the decision-making model of the Cuban Missile Crisis (usually with the slant that President Kennedy's actions were near-ideal), there is one major way that crises 50 years ago differ from those of today -- they were often conducted in secret or near-secret conditions.

Today, the case for intervention is made to the public because without public support any war will falter. Experience has taught us that politicians making decisions about war and peace without public input will lead us into disaster. That was part of the Vietnam Syndrome. The skepticism the public shows to the case made to it for war and those promoting war are primary symptoms of the Iraq Syndrome.

Well, if it took a war to get us to this amount of skepticism, that really is sad. But at least we give a case for war a hard, skeptical look, with reality rather than transformation in mind, we will be better off in the future than we are today.

Foreign Policy Establishment Supports Withdrawal

Not to exaggerate the value of an online report from a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, but the White House has lost the foreign policy establishment.

This report states that the United States has a bad situation on its hands in Iraq and none of the options available to it are better than gradual disengagement.

Maybe, hopefully, the White House will start to move in that direction. To find out, twenty years from now, that the "surge" was just a Kissingerian move to increase American leverage as we work our way out the door would be maddening. And it would certainly be ineffective long-term policy.

Elvis has Left the Nation-Building

Moqtada Al-Sadr has reportedly left Iraq for Iran due to fears of American attacks and divisions within his own Mahdi Army evidenced by recent U.S. attacks on rogue Mahdi Army elements.

What's more interesting is that he apparently left 2-3 weeks ago.

Maybe this shows that the Americans and the Shiite-led government are going to take the militias and warlords leading them seriously. That would be a lot better than reaching some kind of understanding that lets the militias run amok.

Or maybe it shows that the government tipped Sadr off and he was able to get out before being arrested. That would be the less-optimistic analysis.

Who knows. All we know is, he'll be back.

Who Pays?

According to the recently-released "breakthrough" agreement with North Korea coming out of the six-party talks and secret one-on-one talks with the United States in Berlin, the five other parties will arrange for energy assistance to North Korea, with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to come within 60 days. This is part of an exchange for nuclear suspension or denuclearization, depending on who you talk to.

One very good question is, who will pay for and provide these 50,000 tons of oil?

It isn't Japan, who says it will not provide energy aid to North Korea until North Korea resolves the issue of 13 or more Japanese abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. This issue will certainly not be completed soon enough for the Japanese to provide this aid within 60 days.

By March 19, the working group of the six parties on the energy assistance provisions of the agreement are supposed to resolve how the emergency energy aid will be provided. We'll know then if the United States, China, Russia, or South Korea will pay -- it certainly won't be Japan.

The Shape of the North Korea Agreement

The United States, North Korea, and the four other negotiating an agreement to suspend, and eventually end, North Korea's nuclear weapons programs have reported a tentative agreement pending acceptance in the six capitals.

It is supposed to look like the agreement under discussion, except for changes to the energy supply section. Until the North Koreans agree for certain, let's cross our fingers and think of what to do if the North Koreans won't sign off on the deal.

Dealing with Iran

Today's Washington Post has two very interesting articles on American policy toward Iran. The first discusses the Bush Administration's moves to make its Iran policy less about public denouncements of the Iranian government and more about effective limitations on Iran's reach.

Of course, the story appears to be part of a larger - and largely anonymous - Administration effort to show that it is dealing with Iran effectively and not just breathing fire.

The second addresses Administration problems with Iran's mixed approach to Al Qaeda. Iran is capturing some Al Qaeda operatives traveling through Iran but some very major players are under nominal "house arrest." The Bush Administration is pushing hard to marginalize Iran and is trying to use Iran's failure to cooperate regarding these Al Qaeda members against it.

The Bush Administration wants to use this lack of cooperation to leverage Europe and Security Council members to take steps against Iran by pointing to their support for terrorists - Al Qaeda, Iraqi militias (and Hamas and Hezbollah, etc.). As the article shows, the Bush Administration's unwillingness to adhere to basic norms for detention means that we cannot gain custody of wanted terrorists.

You wonder whether a different Administration would have the guts to implement a strategy advanced by the perceptive Vali Nasr and Ray Tayekh -- constructive engagement with Iran to marginalize its clerical rulers. I think this merits a full and honest analysis.