Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Foreign Affairs: Withdraw from Iraq

I have written before that it seemed that Foreign Affairs, the premier large-circulation magazine of international relations in the United States has turned against the war.

This article, in March's issue but available online, says that the war in Iraq is definitely a civil war and that the best U.S. option is to withdraw from the central fighting:

If the Bush administration sticks to its "stay the course toward victory" approach, of which the surge option is the latest incarnation, it will become increasingly apparent that this policy amounts to siding with the Shiites in an extremely vicious Sunni-Shiite war. U.S. troops may play some positive role in preventing human rights abuses by Iraqi army units and slowing down violence and ethnic cleansing. But as long as the United States remains committed to trying to make this Iraqi government "succeed" on the terms President Bush has laid out, there is no escaping the fact that the central function of U.S. troops will be to backstop Maliki's government or its successor. That security gives Maliki and his coalition the ability to tacitly pursue (or acquiesce in) a dirty war against actual and imagined Sunni antagonists while publicly supporting "national reconciliation."

This policy is hard to defend on the grounds of either morality or national interest. Even if Shiite thugs and their facilitators in the government could succeed in ridding Baghdad of Sunnis, it is highly unlikely that they would be able to suppress the insurgency in the Sunni-majority provinces in western Iraq or to prevent attacks in Baghdad and other places where Shiites live. In other words, the current U.S. policy probably will not lead to a decisive military victory anytime soon, if ever. And even if it did, would Washington want it to? The rise of a brutal, ethnically exclusivist, Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad would further the perception of Iran as the ascendant regional power. Moreover, U.S. backing for such a government would give Iraqi Sunnis and the Sunni-dominated countries in the Middle East no reason not to support al Qaeda as an ally in Iraq. By spurring these states to support Sunni forces fighting the Shiite government, such backing would ultimately pit the United States against those states in a proxy war.
Fearon's argument certainly sounds like things I've heard a number of other places, but now that it is being placed, without counterpoint, in Foreign Affairs, indicates just how the editors of that magazine think about the war in Iraq.

Anyway, as for the actual merits of the article, they are many. It has an interesting comparison to urban left-right and group-based gang/militia fighting in Turkey in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but says that the powerful Turkish military was able to end that fighting in ways the United States cannot in Iraq.

The article also highlights the Iraq Study Group's finding that partition (the Biden solution to Iraq) is likely a bloody, pointless non-starter.

The article is worth a read, and if you have the time, very interesting.

Sunday, February 18, 2007

The Musa Qala Problem

The Afghan government, its NATO allies, and Pakistan all face the same problem.

They want to let pushtun Afghan and Waziristan local governments rule themselves. In a way, they have to because Afghan, Pakistani and NATO really can't control the countryside. National authorities just don't have the numbers or local support to do it.

But the local authorities, well-intentioned as they may (or may not) be, cannot compete with the power of the Taliban. And as a result, deals like those made in Waziristan or Musa Qala in Afghanistan, under which Afghan, NATO and Pakistani forces leave areas and local elders take over, just cannot succeed. Taliban forces come in, take over, and then state-sanctioned national authorities have to use bombings and rough tactics to take the area back.

Based on the local conditions and numbers of troops, these types of deals are pretty predictable. But based on the way these local turnovers have turned out, they seem like predictably bad ideas.

Saturday, February 17, 2007

Black Hawk Down Redux

Seized documents purportedly from Al Qaeda in Iraq show that attacks on American helicopters are part of a coordinated strategy in Iraq.

In Mogadishu, Somali militias opposed to American attacks knew the lesson of Vietnam. If you can inflict casualties on American forces and a military action will become unpopular, and end. Somali put this lesson to vivid effect by downing American helicopters in October 1993 and bringing an end to the U.S. mission in Somalia.

Al Qaeda in Iraq appears to have learned the lesson of Somalia -- if you can down American helicopters and show the American public that you are doing it, you will shake U.S. military efforts.

While a new strategy, this looks like a predictable reaction to the way the United States uses helicopters to get around IEDs and support Iraqi and American military operations. It also reflects the aspirations of insurgents and terrorists to attack symbolic targets.

I hope this predictability means the United States will be able to respond effectively. While some attacks on helicopters appear to have succeeded, Americans appear to have responded well to crashes in at least several reported instances. They have moved quickly to protect downed personnel and helicopters. This kind of effective response will keep Iraqi terrorists from having more Black Hawk Down moments.

The Senate's Next Decision

Having failed to invoke cloture on S. 547, the resolution opposing the "surge," Senate Democrats will have to consider whether they will allow some version of Senator Judd Gregg's amendment to support the troops (currently S. 641) to be attached to the Senate resolution.

This amendment would "express the sense of Congress that no funds should be cut off or reduced for American troops in the field which would result in undermining their safety or their ability to complete their assigned missions."

It would be something of a move to forestall the Democrats' next steps toward ending the Iraq war. However, I think that if the Senate moves forward with a vote that includes as a core element the disapproval of President Bush's conduct of the war, Senator Gregg's amendment won't matter.

The general sense of what Senate Democrats have to be able to live with if they are to seek cloture is this: a measure that requires every Senator, in some way, to express whether they support President Bush's conduct of the war. It has to be a vote that doesn't let Republicans say they stand for one part of what they voted on but not another part.

Senate Votes Against Debating Iraq War Resolution

After a difficult, tightly managed debate, the U.S. Senate just voted 56-34 against proceeding to a vote on S. 574, a Senate bill expressing, as the House did, disapproval of a House-passed Iraq war resolution. Democrats tried to move to vote on that measure by invoking cloture on debate, i.e., cutting off Senators' opportunities to filibuster.

In addition to all Senate Democrats, seven Republican Senators - Senators Coleman, Collins, Hagel, Smith, Snowe, Specter, and Warner - voted in favor of the motion.

Ten Republican Senators did not vote and presumably were not present, most notably Senator McCain, who is out trying to run for President. It seems that these Republicans must have been certain that the vote would go their way.

I doubt very much that this will be the last time that Democrats try to push for a similar vote. They've done it before and only got two Republicans. But in the end, if they cannot peel off three more Republican Senators to reach 60, Democrats will never get to a vote on the substance of these crucial measures.

As Senator Schumer said today, this debate and vote would have been the first steps toward eventually ending the war in Iraq. It did not happen today, but I believe this vote was positive.

First, it identified those Republican Senators who will consistently support a move to vote for a resolution of this strength. This allows Democrats to make the next chess moves toward a debate and vote on Iraq. Will Democrats have to take Senator Gregg's desired amendment to "support the troops" into account? To get to 60 votes, Democrats might have to.

Second, it put pressure on Senator McCain to support his position on the war in Iraq. As we move toward the general elections, Senator McCain will have to explain why he did not vote when he supposedly supports the President's plans for increasing troop numbers in Iraq so strongly.

And third, it allowed Democratic Senators to say they are moving the legislative agenda the voters chose in November -- a change of course in Iraq -- into effect. I think they are trying hard, even if it is difficult to move this kind of legislation through the Senate.

Thursday, February 15, 2007

The Iraq Syndrome

President Bush claims that a Middle Eastern enemy state is consorting with and giving weapons to terrorists. He says it is developing weapons of mass destruction.

But wait. When some in his Administration make the mistake of tying these actions to the highest levels of the Iranian government, President Bush takes a step back. He says, no, while he is sure that a major power in Iran, the Quds Force, is supplying Shiite militias terrorizing Sunnis in Iraq, he is not certain that Iran's top leaders have sanctioned this.

While the provided facts are similar to the case for war against Iraq -- hazy claims about weapons systems and capabilities along with background briefings aimed at putting Administration claims in the press and swaying politicians and diplomats -- the President is not moving forward on Iran the same way he did with Iraq.

And that, my friends, is what the Washington Post is calling the "Iraq Syndrome", a hesitancy to take intelligence at face value and run with it. A "Baghdad briefer" who goes too far in saying that shaped charges in Iran were put there by Supreme Leader Khamenei is slapped down.

Before the war in Iraq, an important aspect of Bush Administration thinking was that intelligence was insufficient, action was necessary, and that policymakers had to assemble what information they could from the avalanche of data often available from intelligence services.

Now, skepticism of intelligence is leavened with a healthy dose of public skepticism toward policymakers, in particular, toward non-professional high-level ideologues. While international relations and politics students are taught about the decision-making model of the Cuban Missile Crisis (usually with the slant that President Kennedy's actions were near-ideal), there is one major way that crises 50 years ago differ from those of today -- they were often conducted in secret or near-secret conditions.

Today, the case for intervention is made to the public because without public support any war will falter. Experience has taught us that politicians making decisions about war and peace without public input will lead us into disaster. That was part of the Vietnam Syndrome. The skepticism the public shows to the case made to it for war and those promoting war are primary symptoms of the Iraq Syndrome.

Well, if it took a war to get us to this amount of skepticism, that really is sad. But at least we give a case for war a hard, skeptical look, with reality rather than transformation in mind, we will be better off in the future than we are today.

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

Foreign Policy Establishment Supports Withdrawal

Not to exaggerate the value of an online report from a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, but the White House has lost the foreign policy establishment.

This report states that the United States has a bad situation on its hands in Iraq and none of the options available to it are better than gradual disengagement.

Maybe, hopefully, the White House will start to move in that direction. To find out, twenty years from now, that the "surge" was just a Kissingerian move to increase American leverage as we work our way out the door would be maddening. And it would certainly be ineffective long-term policy.

Elvis has Left the Nation-Building

Moqtada Al-Sadr has reportedly left Iraq for Iran due to fears of American attacks and divisions within his own Mahdi Army evidenced by recent U.S. attacks on rogue Mahdi Army elements.

What's more interesting is that he apparently left 2-3 weeks ago.

Maybe this shows that the Americans and the Shiite-led government are going to take the militias and warlords leading them seriously. That would be a lot better than reaching some kind of understanding that lets the militias run amok.

Or maybe it shows that the government tipped Sadr off and he was able to get out before being arrested. That would be the less-optimistic analysis.

Who knows. All we know is, he'll be back.

Who Pays?

According to the recently-released "breakthrough" agreement with North Korea coming out of the six-party talks and secret one-on-one talks with the United States in Berlin, the five other parties will arrange for energy assistance to North Korea, with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to come within 60 days. This is part of an exchange for nuclear suspension or denuclearization, depending on who you talk to.

One very good question is, who will pay for and provide these 50,000 tons of oil?

It isn't Japan, who says it will not provide energy aid to North Korea until North Korea resolves the issue of 13 or more Japanese abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. This issue will certainly not be completed soon enough for the Japanese to provide this aid within 60 days.

By March 19, the working group of the six parties on the energy assistance provisions of the agreement are supposed to resolve how the emergency energy aid will be provided. We'll know then if the United States, China, Russia, or South Korea will pay -- it certainly won't be Japan.

Monday, February 12, 2007

The Shape of the North Korea Agreement

The United States, North Korea, and the four other negotiating an agreement to suspend, and eventually end, North Korea's nuclear weapons programs have reported a tentative agreement pending acceptance in the six capitals.

It is supposed to look like the agreement under discussion, except for changes to the energy supply section. Until the North Koreans agree for certain, let's cross our fingers and think of what to do if the North Koreans won't sign off on the deal.

Sunday, February 11, 2007

Dealing with Iran

Today's Washington Post has two very interesting articles on American policy toward Iran. The first discusses the Bush Administration's moves to make its Iran policy less about public denouncements of the Iranian government and more about effective limitations on Iran's reach.

Of course, the story appears to be part of a larger - and largely anonymous - Administration effort to show that it is dealing with Iran effectively and not just breathing fire.

The second addresses Administration problems with Iran's mixed approach to Al Qaeda. Iran is capturing some Al Qaeda operatives traveling through Iran but some very major players are under nominal "house arrest." The Bush Administration is pushing hard to marginalize Iran and is trying to use Iran's failure to cooperate regarding these Al Qaeda members against it.

The Bush Administration wants to use this lack of cooperation to leverage Europe and Security Council members to take steps against Iran by pointing to their support for terrorists - Al Qaeda, Iraqi militias (and Hamas and Hezbollah, etc.). As the article shows, the Bush Administration's unwillingness to adhere to basic norms for detention means that we cannot gain custody of wanted terrorists.

You wonder whether a different Administration would have the guts to implement a strategy advanced by the perceptive Vali Nasr and Ray Tayekh -- constructive engagement with Iran to marginalize its clerical rulers. I think this merits a full and honest analysis.