Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra

WHERE IS IRAQ HEADING? LESSONS FROM BASRA
Middle East Report N°67 – 25 June 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i
I. CHARACTERISTICS ................................................................................................... 1
A. DIVERSITY ............................................................................................................................1
B. “SOUTHERNISM”...................................................................................................................4
C. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE ........................................................................................................7
II. OIL, MILITIAS AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR RESOURCES ................................ 9
A. SUBVERTING THE STATE .....................................................................................................11
B. CIRCUMVENTING THE STATE...............................................................................................14
III. OPERATION SINBAD................................................................................................ 16
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 18
APPENDICES
A. MAP OF IRAQ ......................................................................................................................19
B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................20
C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA...................................................................................................................21
D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................23
Middle East Report N°67 25 June 2007
WHERE IS IRAQ HEADING? LESSONS FROM BASRA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Amid the media and military focus on Baghdad, another
major Iraqi city – Basra – is being overlooked. Yet
Basra’s experience carries important lessons for the capital
and nation as a whole. Coalition forces have already
implemented a security plan there, Operation Sinbad,
which was in many ways similar to Baghdad’s current
military surge. What U.S. commanders call “clear, hold
and build”, their British counterparts earlier had dubbed
“clear, hold and civil reconstruction”. And, as in the
capital, the putative goal was to pave the way for a
takeover by Iraqi forces. Far from being a model to
be replicated, however, Basra is an example of what
to avoid. With renewed violence and instability, Basra
illustrates the pitfalls of a transitional process that has
led to collapse of the state apparatus and failed to build
legitimate institutions. Fierce intra-Shiite fighting also
disproves the simplistic view of Iraq neatly divided
between three homogenous communities.
Lack of attention to Basra is understandable. Iraq’s future
is often believed to depend on Baghdad, and most of the
spectacular bombings have taken place in the centre of the
country, far from the southern city. Observers, by now
accustomed to the capital’s dynamics, have had difficulty
making sense of Basra’s and so have tended to downplay
them. Finally, because U.S. forces have not been directly
involved, news coverage has been both limited to Arabic
and British media and forced to compete with the
gruesome violence that is tearing the centre apart.
But to neglect Basra is a mistake. The nation’s second
largest city, it is located in its most oil-rich region. Basra
governorate also is the only region enjoying maritime
access, making it the country’s de facto economic capital
and a significant prize for local political actors.
Sandwiched between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, at
the intersection of the Arab and Persian worlds, the region
is strategically important. Sociologically, Basra’s identity
essentially has been forged in opposition not only to the
capital but also to other major southern cities such
as Najaf and Karbala. For these reasons, it is wrong
either to ignore it or lump it together with an imaginary,
undifferentiated Shiite south.
On its face, Basra’s security plan ranked as a qualified
success. Between September 2006 and March 2007,
Operation Sinbad sought to rout out militias and hand
security over to newly vetted and stronger Iraqi security
forces while kick-starting economic reconstruction.
Criminality, political assassinations and sectarian killings,
all of which were rampant in 2006, receded somewhat
and – certainly as compared to elsewhere in the country
– a relative calm prevailed. Yet this reality was both
superficial and fleeting. By March–April 2007, renewed
political tensions once more threatened to destabilise the
city, and relentless attacks against British forces in effect
had driven them off the streets into increasingly secluded
compounds. Basra’s residents and militiamen view this not
as an orderly withdrawal but rather as an ignominious
defeat. Today, the city is controlled by militias, seemingly
more powerful and unconstrained than before.
What progress has occurred cannot conceal the most
glaring failing of all: the inability to establish a legitimate
and functioning provincial apparatus capable of
redistributing resources, imposing respect for the rule of
law and ensuring a peaceful transition at the local level.
Basra’s political arena remains in the hands of actors
engaged in bloody competition for resources, undermining
what is left of governorate institutions and coercively
enforcing their rule. The local population has no choice
but to seek protection from one of the dominant camps.
Periods of stability do not reflect greater governing
authority so much as they do a momentary – and fragile
– balance of interests or of terror between rival militias.
Inevitably, conflicts re-emerge and even apparently minor
incidents can set off a cycle of retaliatory violence. A
political process designed to pacify competition and
ensure the non-violent allocation of goods and power
has become a source of intense and often brutal struggle.
Basra is a case study of Iraq’s multiple and multiplying
forms of violence. These often have little to do with
sectarianism or anti-occupation resistance. Instead, they
involve the systematic misuse of official institutions,
political assassinations, tribal vendettas, neighbourhood
vigilantism and enforcement of social mores, together
with the rise of criminal mafias that increasingly
intermingle with political actors. Should other causes of
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page ii
strife – sectarian violence and the fight against coalition
forces – recede, the concern must still be that Basra's
fate will be replicated throughout the country on a larger,
more chaotic and more dangerous scale. The lessons are
clear. Iraq’s violence is multifaceted, and sectarianism
is only one of its sources. It follows that the country’s
division along supposedly inherent and homogenous
confessional and ethnic lines is not an answer. It follows,
too, that rebuilding the state, tackling militias and
imposing the rule of law cannot be done without
confronting the parties that currently dominate the
political process and forging a new and far more inclusive
political compact.
Iraq is in the midst of a civil war. But before and beyond
that, Iraq has become a failed state – a country whose
institutions and, with them, any semblance of national
cohesion, have been obliterated. That is what has made
the violence – all the violence: sectarian, anti-coalition,
political, criminal and otherwise – both possible and, for
many, necessary. Resolving the confrontation between
Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds is one priority. But
rebuilding a functioning and legitimate state is another –
no less urgent, no less important and no less daunting.
Damascus/Amman/Brussels, 25 June 2007
Middle East Report N°67 25 June 2007
WHERE IS IRAQ HEADING? LESSONS FROM BASRA
I. CHARACTERISTICS
A. DIVERSITY
Basra is a pluralistic, socially diverse city. Although
most inhabitants are Shiites, it also is home to sizeable
communities of Sunnis (Arab and Kurdish), Christians
(chiefly Chaldaean, Assyrian and Armenian) and
Mandaeans, a pre-Islamic Gnostic sect.1 The impact of
these minorities can be felt in several neighbourhoods,
such as ‘Ashshar and Suq al-Shaykh. As a port city,
Basra has attracted a wide variety of merchants
(including the Khudhayri, Garibian, Salih, Asfar and
Naqib families) and, with strong ties to the outside
world, traditionally has enjoyed a high degree of intercommunal
tolerance. After the eighth century, the city
also included a black minority (Zinj), which further
enriched its diversity. Basra’s vibrant pluralism –
expressed in a variety of poetry, theatre and Africaninspired
songs – powerfully shaped culture, both before
and after the establishment of modern-day Iraq.
Prior to the nationwide outbreak of sectarian violence
in 2006, its residents prided themselves on being
cosmopolitan. The dean of a Basra university said:
People in Basra have always wanted to live in
peace, accepting others regardless of their sectarian
or religious identity. Christians live beside Muslims
and Sunnis beside Shiites. At one point, we even
had a large Jewish minority. We are used to living
amid such diversity. People have always been
accustomed to living with foreigners and members
of other faiths. Christians, Jews and Muslims in
Basra were never fanatics. Indeed they were rather
open-minded.2
Other factors account for the pluralism of the city and its
immediate environs. Historically, the region of Basra and,
more generally, the south, was populated by nomadic
and sedentary Sunni tribes, although Shiite minorities
dwelled in the city and its surroundings, notably Qurna.
1 To Crisis Group’s knowledge, no reliable data on the makeup
of Basra’s society exists.
2 Crisis Group interview, dean of a Basra university, Basra,
March 2005.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most sedentary
tribes converted to Shiism.3 There were some exceptions,
most notably the al-Sa’dun who ruled over the Muntafiq,
a vast tribal confederation. As a result the tribal makeup
was predominantly Shiite, with residual but deep-rooted
Sunni pockets such as Zubayr, south west of Basra.
During the nineteenth century, the city’s role as an
administrative centre grew and it attracted large numbers
of civil servants from other areas of the country. Given
the Ottoman Empire’s preference, these often belonged
to the Sunni bourgeoisie. Oil discovery and state
modernisation in the twentieth century further accelerated
the influx of bureaucrats, specialised workers, teachers
and engineers from Baghdad and elsewhere. By midcentury,
even before the oil industry had developed,
a Westernised, urban middle class had emerged. A
university professor described it:
It was a glorious age. Basra residents were open to
different cultures while simultaneously protecting
their own. Here, music and food always have been
diverse. But we also used to go to the theatre.
Everything was modern and civilised. All along
the waterfront were an international circus,
swimming pools and casinos. We used to have
fun riding boats. But since those blessed days,
most educated people and artists have left.4
From the early 1930s until the first coup against the
monarchy in 1958, the agricultural sector suffered a
severe economic crisis which led to a significant rural
exodus. Later, in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the
former regime’s decision to drain the marshlands –
which historically had provided sanctuary to opposition
members, deserters and criminals – and forcibly transfer
its inhabitants triggered another mass movement toward
urban areas. Both waves brought in new inhabitants,
leading to tensions with the established local
bourgeoisie. Migrants of tribal origin tended to populate
neighbourhoods at the old city’s periphery, such as
Jumhuriya, Asma’i, Husayn, Hayaniya, Khamsa Miles
and Tannuma.
3 Yitzhak Nakash, “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes to Shiism”,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 3, 1994.
4 Crisis Group interview, Basra university professor, Basra,
March 2005.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 2
In the aftermath of the regime’s ouster in 2003, these
recently urbanised areas became more assertive. In
particular, the Hayaniya, whose history and make-up
are highly reminiscent of Baghdad’s Sadr City, became a
Sadrist stronghold.5 As governorate structures collapsed,
tribes assumed an increasingly important political role.
Some tribal chiefs organised themselves politically,
for example by joining the Iraqi Federal Assembly
established in December 2004;6 many joined pre-existing
parties at the time of the 2005 elections.
Relations between longer-term Basra dwellers and
recently urbanised tribes remain tense, tainted by
prejudice. Tribal members are considered unable to
assimilate to urban life and are accused of crimes and
moral vices. In the aftermath of Saddam’s ouster, one
tribe in particular, the Garamsha, became the symbol
of what supposedly was wrong with them all. In the
words of a Basra journalist:
The Garamsha fled the marshes and took refuge
in the city when Saddam Hussein destroyed their
traditional habitat. At that point, they faced the
difficulties of urban life. In the marshes, they had
neither school nor hospital. None of them had a
university diploma or a profession. In short, they
had a very hard time assimilating, and many were
involved in theft and brawls. Some, after having
sold their herd, bought boats and got caught up
in black market trafficking. Of course, not all
Garamsha are like that. In fact, many are very nice
and generous. But they suffer from widespread
prejudice toward the Ma’dan [a word now
commonly used to describe those from the marshes,
shorthand for backward and undeveloped].7
Basra’s Shiite community itself is diverse. A large minority
of Shaykhiya lives alongside the more mainstream
Usuliya strand of Twelver Shiite Islam (to which both
Iraq’s leading Shiite religious figure, Ali al-Sistani, and
5 See Crisis Group Middle East Report Nº55, Iraq’s Muqtada
al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?, 11 June 2006, p. 5. It is said to
have become a refuge for many Sadrist commanders fleeing
the Bagdhad “surge”: “Since the Americans put pressure on us
in Baghdad, as a result of the surge plan, many Mahdi Army
commanders fled and came to Basra. Most often, they originate
from the south, either Maysan or Basra. They come straight to
Hayaniya, whose inhabitants are also from Maysan. With their
help and expertise, we’ve managed to organise our operation
far more efficiently. They’re strong you know!” Crisis Group
interview, local Mahdi Army commander, Basra, June 2007.
6 The Iraqi Federal Assembly includes local personalities of
tribal and non-tribal origin. It advocates a type of “administrative
federalism”, in other words greater local managerial autonomy.
Crisis Group interview, five tribal chiefs active in the Iraqi
Federal Assembly, Basra, March 2005.
7 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, August 2006.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei belong).8 Unlike
most Iraqi Shiites, who choose their Marja (“source of
emulation”) from among leading religious scholars from
Najaf and Karbala in Iraq or Qom and Mashhad in Iran,
the Shaykhiya do not recognise any ayatollah’s authority.
Instead, they follow their own communal leader, Ali
al-Musawi, who also heads Shaykhiya minorities in
Karbala, Iran and the Gulf. The Shaykhiya shun any
political role, accepting the legitimacy of earthly power.9
Their wealth, based on agriculture, real estate and
voluntary contributions to Musawi, has further
consolidated their status in the city despite lingering bias.10
Tensions notwithstanding, Basra long was proud of its
social, religious and cultural diversity. That has radically
changed, an outcome of its rapid Islamisation and the
growth of sectarianism among its political class. Its
tradition of tolerance and open-mindedness – shared not
only by the bourgeoisie and more recently urbanised
residents,11 but also religious circles12 – has been
thoroughly undone by the rise of Islamist movements.
8 The founder of the Shaykhiya school of thought, Ahmad al-
Ahsa’i (deceased in 1826), developed an esoteric theology
according to which the community’s imam, as one of the few
“perfect Shiites”, enjoys a direct spiritual relationship with
the hidden imam, the last of a lineage of twelve “infallible”
imams recognised by Twelver Shiites. For a description of
Twelver Shiism, see Crisis Group Middle East Report Nº37,
Understanding Islamism, 2 March 2005, p.19.
9 The Shaykhiya, therefore, were treated relatively leniently by
Saddam’s regime. Their mosque, built between 1982 and 1997
during a period of intense repression of Shiite militancy, is one
of the city’s largest and certainly its most visible. It can hold up
to 12,000 people. Crisis Group interview, Zayn al-Din Salih
al-Musawi, Ali al-Musawi’s spokesman, Basra, March 2005.
10 The Shaykhiya are routinely described as non-Twelvers
by other Shiites in Basra. Aside from theological differences, a
popular theory among Basra residents is that the Shaykhiya –
locally known as Awlad Amir or Hasawiya – are of Saudi rather
than Iraqi extraction. Although this is true of the movement’s
founder, its followers in Basra undoubtedly are Iraqi. Crisis
Group interviews, variety of Basrawis, Basra, 2006–2007.
11 Marsh tribes practice a specific and relatively flexible faith.
For as long as it was possible, their sheikhs openly disapproved
of the political scene’s Islamisation, for instance criticising Ali
al-Sistani’s support for Sharia as the sole source of law. Crisis
Group interviews, tribal chiefs, Basra, March 2005. As one put
it, “we want a secular government, federal and tolerant. We
don’t want a religious state. We hate the idea of a single party or
of one-person rule to begin with. But we also don’t want Sharia
law. We accept it as a reference, not as a main rule. One should
respect all human beings and I, for one, favour women’s rights”.
Crisis Group interview, Basra, March 2005.
12 The daughter of one of the city’s leading religious figures
complained of the brutality of certain Islamist groups. “The
way they are trying to impose their rules is a very bad thing.
Islam is a peaceful religion”. Crisis Group interview, Basra,
March 2005.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 3
Almost immediately upon the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, they established a presence at universities and
hospitals which, through intimidation and violence, they
gradually took over. With the state’s collapse, armed
Islamist groups sought to fill the security vacuum, fighting
crime and rigidly policing social mores, but also
engaging in illicit behaviour such as oil trafficking.13
The January 2005 elections for parliament and local
councils, far from opening up the political field, formalised
the domination of Islamist parties, notably the Sadrist
current, al-Fadhila (a Sadrist spin-off, founded in 2003 by
the Najaf-based cleric Muhammad al-Ya’qubi and whose
popular base is concentrated in Basra), the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, recently
renamed Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, SIIC)14 and
Tha’r Allah, an exclusively local party formed by Yusif
al-Musawi.
[In Basra] the January elections were marred by
violent intimidation beforehand and equally brutal
intimidation afterwards.…Sadrist factions and
SCIRI affiliates such as Badr and Tha’r Allah
accelerated their intimidation of local university
professors, trade unionists and other secular
figures. Most Iraqis were forced under the
protective umbrella of enforced party membership,
and those who attempted to make a stand were
intimidated and sometimes killed.15
After the elections, fear spread throughout the city.
Hospitals largely fell under Islamist control and, with rare
exceptions, came under intense and increasing pressure.16
13 Crisis Group interviews, oil smugglers complaining about this
newfound competition, Basra, October 2003. One Islamist party
leader, who claimed to have led resistance to Saddam Hussein’s
regime, was widely known as having long been involved in
smuggling – an activity that presupposed close relations with
Saddam’s local henchmen.
14 In an 11 May 2007 statement, SCIRI announced it was
dropping the word “Revolution” from its name to reflect what
it called the new situation in Iraq. Al-Hayat, 12 May 2007.
15 Michael Knights and Ed Williams, “The Calm before the
Storm: The British Experience in Southern Iraq”, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #66,
February 2007, p. 27.
16 “Yesterday again a message was sent to me by the Sadrists
through the general director for hospitals. They once more raised
the issue of male doctors caring for female patients. They sent a
letter summoning me to their headquarters. I responded that I
had nothing to do with them, that I am an official and that any
request should be addressed to the governorate or ministry of
health. Six months ago, they already had tried to impose their
rules in my hospital but I prevented them. Had I let them, we
would have Sadr posters all over the walls. But they control
most of the other hospitals. Some even had to change their
name. For instance, the teaching hospital is now called the Sadr
Women university students – Muslims but also
Christians – were forced to wear a veil.17 This repressive
atmosphere was epitomised by a tragic incident in which
Sadrists hit a woman attending a student picnic, tore off
her clothes and then shot to death two students who tried
to intervene – all in front of the police. The girl,
humiliated, killed herself shortly thereafter.18 Despite
widespread outrage, the culprits reportedly went
unpunished.19 Indeed, the very topic of social and
political Islamisation became taboo:
It is a highly sensitive issue. We have not been
able to debate it openly because everyone is
scared. If I express my opinion, I will get into real
trouble. Islamists will accuse me of not being a real
Muslim – which I am. My daughters are being
forced to wear a hijab, but it’s deeper than that. I
once was lecturing on the issue of corruption in the
south and on oil-related pollution. One of those
guys came up to me and suggested I might need
a security detail because I could be targeted.
Basically, he was telling me to steer clear of
anything affecting their interests. Some people have
been killed despite bodyguards. It can happen
anywhere, anytime.20
This trend accelerated in 2006, with a dramatic escalation
in homicides.21 Victims included pragmatic, secular figures
hospital”. Crisis Group interview, hospital director, Basra,
March 2005.
17 “My students are all pressured to wear a veil. They are afraid.
Those people say that even Christian women should wear the
hijab. Two of my Armenian friends have begun to wear it.
When I saw them, I said ‘what are you doing, how can you give
up?’ They said they were afraid. I gave up mini-skirts long ago.
We are a conservative society anyway. But wearing the hijab,
that’s something entirely different”. Crisis Group interview,
Christian professor at Basra University, Basra, March 2005.
18 Crisis Group interviews, university students, Basra, March
2005.
19 “The fact that religious groups are taking control of the city
is extremely worrying. I think that ultimately we will have to
fight to get them off campus grounds. Most people resent
these young religious hotheads. After the picnic incident, tribal
leaders got together and issued a communiqué declaring their
support for the students and condemning the violence. But most
people fear the Sadrists. It’s not that they have so much real
power. But they have the power to kill and frighten. For instance,
we heard that twelve barbers were killed around the country
because they had shaved off beards. The Islamists are installing
a climate of fear. The authorities did not utter a word after the
picnic incident because they, too, are afraid”. Crisis Group
interview, Basra university professor, Basra, March 2005.
20 Crisis Group interview, Basra University researcher, Basra,
March 2005.
21 The number of reported homicide victims climbed steadily
from a monthly rate of fifteen in November 2005 to 30 in
February 2006 and over 100 in the following months. “Basrah
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 4
– university professors, journalists, human rights activists,
trade unionists, communists and other intellectuals – but
also people killed purely based on sectarian affiliation.
Sunnis, who already had been targeted under the guise of
de-Baathification, came under heightened attack after
the February 2006 destruction of the Shiite mosque in
Samarra, which triggered countrywide retaliation.22 For
various reasons members of other minorities, notably
Christians, were forced to flee.23 Tribal chiefs who opposed
or challenged the Islamist movements’ enhanced control
were not spared; many were summarily killed.24 The end
result has been an effective, Islamist-led purge that
eradicated Basra’s liberal political culture.
B. “SOUTHERNISM”
A central element of Basra’s identity involves its
relationship to the rest of the country, often summed
up as Janubiya (“southernism”).25 Residents long have
resented the central state for simultaneously ostracising
and taking advantage of them, acting both as freeloader
and repressor. A local religious leader lamented that even
though the governorate provides most of the central state’s
revenue and possesses the country’s most important
Governorate Assessment Report”, UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), August 2006, pp. 8-9.
22 See Crisis Group Middle East Report Nº52, The Next Iraqi
War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, 27 February 2006.
23 See The New York Times, 31 July 2005; also “Sectarian
Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq”,
The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on
Internal Displacement Occasional Paper, October 2006. That
said, Basra’s Christians are better off than its Sunnis. As a priest
put it, “in Basra, Christians tend to be less targeted because we
don’t play a part in the wider sectarian conflict. Many Christians
left Basra for economic reasons, traveling up north or to Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria and the West in the hope of finding better
opportunities. The ongoing political struggle in Basra has
indeed deprived Christians of job opportunities insofar as
influential political parties apportioned state jobs among
themselves. Those who stayed behind for the most part have
kept a low profile and sought to maintain peaceful relations with
other groups in the city”. Crisis Group interview, a priest, Basra,
March 2007.
24 “Twenty five tribal chiefs recently were assassinated,
including three from the Bani Asad, the head of the al-’Isa, the
head of the Albu Mohammad and three heads of al-Garamsha.
After the fall of the former regime, most tribal chiefs got
involved in lawful and unlawful commerce and competed
with politicians. This often led to fighting. Some of the most
influential tribal chiefs – for example those with electoral
influence – were killed for that reason. Today, the tribes hate
political parties”. Crisis Group interview, teacher, Basra, August
2006.
25 An alternative translation is “southernness”.
power plant, “our electricity share is meagre”.26 Virtually
all inhabitants blame the former regime for failing to
invest in local infrastructure and public services despite
their heavy sacrifices, particularly during the Iran-Iraq
war.27 As a result of its authoritarian and predatory
behaviour, the state widely came to be seen as an alien,
intrusive power depriving the city of its own wealth. A
university professor said:
Particularly after the 1968 coup [which brought the
Baath Party to power], our economic and social life
was entirely controlled by Baghdad. Everything –
factories, local administration, social services –
was under the capital’s thumb. The intelligence
service was omnipresent on every street corner.
We lived as if under occupation. They tried to cut
our lives to pieces. They didn’t want us to possess
our own identity.28
With only few exceptions, local leaders originated from
other areas of the country:
For many years, Basra inhabitants were ignored
in their own city. No one – not the governor, police
chief, or commander of the local army garrison or
officer in charge of seaports – hailed from there. It
was absurd. Basra is wealthy, with significant oil,
agricultural and maritime resources. But this did
not benefit the city. Had the governor been from
Basra, he would have known and cared about the
local people. But let me give you a simple example:
in 1991, al-Sabah newspaper profiled the various
governors who had been in power in Basra until
then. Out of 41 governors, only one came from the
city.29
Basra inhabitants also are convinced that state institutions
and major Shiite political parties have privileged other
Shiite centres – Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf – at
their expense, as a result of rampant anti-southern
26 Crisis Group interview, religious leader, Basra, March 2005.
27 This sense of suffering is a recurring theme among Basra’s
inhabitants. “Our suffering over the past 35 years has been
particularly harsh. Under Saddam, our sons had to work as
soldiers and manual labourers and were barred from public
service jobs. A large segment of Basra’s population had to
emigrate because of what they suffered under the former regime.
The city is full of war orphans and widows. People live in old
houses that are falling apart for lack of upkeep. The entire city
has only two orphanages and three hospitals. Many people are
sick due to pollution and poor healthcare. In the palm fields,
three to four people are killed daily as a result of unexploded
ordnance. And all this is just a fragment of our suffering”. Crisis
Group interview, Basra parliament member, Basra, March 2005.
28 Crisis Group interview, Basra university professor, Basra,
March 2005.
29 Crisis Group interview, religious leader, Basra, March 2005.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 5
discrimination.30 Neither the former regime’s ouster nor
the ensuing political process is believed to have rectified
this. The local population remains adamant that it is
being both ignored and taken advantage of. A Basra
parliamentarian said:
Despite Iraq’s liberation, we are still suffering. And
regardless of all our suffering, we still can’t boast
of a single minister coming from Basra. Among 35
Iraqi ambassadors dispatched around the world,
not one is from Basra, although Basra is full of
highly educated people. Among the 600 employees
working in the ministry of foreign affairs, not one
is from Basra. In the army’s command, no one is
from Basra. In the national assembly, we have
twelve seats, whereas Najaf, whose population is
much smaller, has 30. Our share of government
funding is probably less than Falluja’s. Meanwhile,
we are responsible for some 80 per cent of the
country’s economic wealth. We have oil,
agriculture, fishing, we produce natural gas and
generate tax revenue from our seaports and land
border crossings. We have immense wealth, and
yet see nothing of it. We keep asking the central
government to give us our fair share but we have
basically lost any trust in it.31
Though not much remains of the Iraqi state, what does is
highly centralised.32 State-imposed restrictions on local
government generate significant resentment. Residents
believe that long delays in allocating Basra’s budget result
from wilful discrimination.33 Although they may in fact
30 See Reidar Visser’s excellent article “Basra, the Reluctant
Seat of Shiastan”, Middle East Report no. 242, spring 2007.
31 Crisis Group interview, parliamentarian, Basra, March 2005.
32 “We have been working under a centralised system for
decades. We have suffered a lot from this and from Baghdad
more generally. It’s always been about receiving orders from
above. People here are not listened to. They can do a lot for
themselves – in terms of economic, social, educational and
health matters. But there is an obstacle, which is the state
bureaucracy, which controls everything. We have to change it”.
Crisis Group interview, member of a Basra research centre,
Basra, March 2005.
33 “The city’s budget for last year was sent by Baghdad in June
2006. The central government is incapable of helping the local
government deliver public services. That’s why the local
government could not carry out basic projects”. Crisis Group
interview, member of Basra’s municipal council, Basra, March
2007. The argument is invoked by officials as an excuse for the
governorate’s own failings, which allegedly include widespread
corruption and diversion of local resources. No funding reached
Basra in 2005, and in 2006 90 per cent of the city’s allocated
budget was available only at the end of the year. Crisis Group
interview, Department for International Development (DFID)
official, London, February 2007. Regardless of who actually
largely be a function of more generalised bureaucratic
overload, they nevertheless reinforce local resentment of
state underinvestment and micromanagement.
Convinced they are being dominated by central authorities,
Basra residents have urged greater administrative and
managerial autonomy. In February 2004, the governor
revived an old separatist dream,34 arguing that Basra and
its governorate should become another Dubai, a region
in control of its wealth and acting as the country’s
economic engine.35 From 2005 onwards, a consensus has
formed in Basra around the idea of strengthening local
government. Virtually all those interviewed by Crisis
Group advocated a form of “administrative federalism”
(Fidiraliya Idariya), short of secession yet heavy on local
management of everyday matters. A university dean
explained:
What does it mean concretely? We consider
sectarian or ethnic forms of federalism dangerous
for the country’s unity. In our eyes, federalism
has more to do with practical things. It is not good
that all institutions remain centralised in Baghdad.
We should have one army and our ambassadors
should represent all of Iraq. But on financial and
administrative matters, we need our local
government to be able to make decisions. Take
my case: I am totally unknown in Baghdad, yet
someone in Baghdad, with no knowledge either
of Basra’s needs or of my ability to satisfy them,
nominated me. There is no justification for such
centralisation of local governance issues.36
The bureaucracy’s high centralisation is a source of anger
among all social strata. Some complain of having to
visit the capital for the most basic administrative tasks.
Entrepreneurs claim Baghdad’s long-distance interference
undermines local economic development.37 Health
was responsible, Basra’s governor conveniently was able to
blame the central government for the absence of reconstruction.
34 See Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism
and Nationalism in Southern Iraq (Münster, 2005).
35 See Gulf News, 24 February 2004. Many Basra businessmen
echoed this call: “Let’s say Basra’s income represents 90 per cent
of Iraq’s. I’m not saying Basra’s budget should be much higher
than the rest, but that one needs to pay particular attention to the
city’s needs. The more Basra develops into a wealthy economic
area, the more revenue it will generate for the rest of the country.
If you develop other parts of the country at Basra’s expense, we
all lose”. Crisis Group interview, member of local chamber of
commerce, Basra, March 2005.
36 Crisis Group interview, dean at Basra university, Basra,
March 2005.
37 “We need more economic freedom. Any commercial law,
financial decision or development plan comes from the
centre but the centre does not understand our needs. We
should suggest to the centre what we need, not the other way
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 6
workers blame delays and disorganisation on the absence
of local decision-making authority.38 Hovering over all
this is recurring fear that, some day, a tyrannical central
government might re-emerge. “As you know, we suffered
a lot from the central government. Excessive centralisation
leads to dictatorial systems. If we favour federalism it also
is in order to minimise the risk of a new, oppressive and
undemocratic central government”.39
The March 2004 adoption of the Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL) – Iraq’s interim constitution, pursuant to which
any three governorates could establish a federal region –
led the southern governorates of Basra, Maysan and Dhi
Qar to combine efforts.40 This reflected both similar
strategic interests and shared hostility to the centre. The
notion of a “southern region” (Iqlim al-Janub) was
particularly attractive to intellectuals, tribal leaders with
roots in all three governorates and political parties with
an essentially local power base such as Fadhila.41 Basra
representatives of national political parties gradually had
to echo the increasingly popular call, leading to tensions
and contradictions with their Baghdad-based headquarters.
As a Sadrist figure in Basra explained, “our leader,
Moqtada al-Sadr, is against federalism. Officially, Sadrists
oppose it because it is a divisive factor as long as we are
under occupation. But personally, I believe in it because I
believe southern Iraq has its own identity, and I believe
we should have a greater share of resources”.42
around”. Crisis Group interview, businessman, Basra, March
2005.
38 “Centralisation is the core of the problem. For instance, if
we need fluid for patients, Baghdad might give all of Basra
governorate 10,000 bottles while, in the capital, every single
hospital will get 40,000. Bottles that come through the port
of Umm Qasr, some 40 miles away, are all sent to Baghdad,
where we have to dispatch trucks to pick up our share – an
amazing waste of time and money. Take another example:
the decision to build a new pediatric hospital in Basra was
taken by the ministry of health, the project was handed over
to someone from central Iraq, and we were never consulted
about any of this”. Crisis Group interview, hospital director,
Basra, March 2005.
39 Crisis Group interview, tribal chief, Basra, March 2005.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Basra’s Sunni population
does not necessarily favour a strong central government,
even one headed by co-religionists. “We prefer a federal,
non-sectarian solution. A federal system would mean no
dictatorship and no centralised bureaucracy”. Crisis Group
interview, Sunni imam, Basra, August 2006.
40 Iraq’s permanent constitution, ratified in a popular vote in
October 2005, allows any number of governorates to create a
region.
41 See Reidar Visser, “Basra, the Reluctant Seat of Shiastan”,
op. cit.
42 Crisis Group interview, Basra, March 2005. “Regional
sentiment in the far south of Iraq is very pronounced and often
In late 2004 and early 2005, several relatively small
political movements emerged whose platform focused
almost exclusively on this southern federalist agenda.
These include the Iraq Federal Assembly and the Council
for the Southern Region, both of which opened offices in
Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar.43 From time to time over the
past two and a half years, they have sought to re-energise
the debate, triggering sharp polemics and angry reactions
from those who believe any type of federalism threatens
national unity and those who (like SCIRI) argue for a
broader region encompassing all nine Shiite-majority
governorates in the south and centre (Iqlim al-Wasat wal-
Janub). For example, on 14 April 2007, the Council for
the Southern Region organised yet another conference
advocating formation of a southern region comprising
Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar governorates.
The question of federalism and its precise contours has
become a central tool in the struggle for political control
over Basra. In the main, it is a tug-of-war between Fadhila
(a member of which, Muhammad al-Wa’ili, was elected
in February 2005 to head the governorate) and SCIRI
(which briefly controlled it after the November 2004
appointment of Hasan al-Rashid as governor).44 For
Fadhila, a southern region limited to the three resourcerich
governorates is highly appealing because the party
has virtually no following elsewhere in the country. In
contrast, SCIRI’s alternative project of a much broader
region, which it has canvassed since 2005, is seen by
Fadhila as a serious threat since it would significantly
dilute its influence. Even though SCIRI’s presence in
overrides the national parties’ central leaderships’ ideology. This
has been seen in Fadhila (which always had stronger popular
support in Basra than anywhere else) and Dawa [the Harakat
al-Da’wa al-Islamiya branch] as well as among Maysan
Sadrists (who sometimes employ regionalist rhetoric when it
comes to oil matters), and even among Basra’s SCIRI members
(some of whom still focus on Basra and the far south even after
the central leadership declared their goal to be a single Shiite
region comprising all nine majority Shiite governorates)”. Crisis
Group email communication with Reidar Visser, 15 April 2007.
43 Crisis Group interviews, representatives of the Iraq Federal
Assembly and the Council for the Southern Region, Basra,
March 2005.
44 Fadhila won twelve of 41 seats in the January 2005
governorate council elections. Although the “Basra Islamic” list
– a coalition – won twenty, Fadhila emerged as the strongest
party. Moreover, it formed an alliance with former Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord, which won four
seats, and the Iraq Future Gathering, a small formation that won
two seats, and later reached a deal with Harakat al-Dawa al-
Islamiya, whose three seats gave it a total of 21 sympathisers.
The council subsequently elected Al-Wa’li governor in a secret
ballot. The positions of deputy governor and president of the
governorate council went, respectively, to Lu’ay al-Battat, head
of the Iraq Future Gathering, and Muhammad al-Abadi, of
Fadhila.
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 7
Basra remains limited, it used its strong parliamentary
representation and alliance with the Kurds to pass a bill
enabling it to promote its own federal agenda.45
The confrontation between SCIRI and Fadhila over
federalism has taken various forms. SCIRI has sought to
keep Basra under Baghdad’s control long enough to force
through a large Shiite federal region, while Fadhila has
tried to strengthen Basra’s autonomy. SCIRI lost ground
after key governorate positions fell under Fadhila’s control
but in May 2006 Fadhila was stripped of the oil ministry
in the central government, leading it to redouble its efforts
in the southern city. Both parties have periodically used
violence, formed alliances with other local organisations46
and resorted to economic ploys. In recent weeks, large
demonstrations have been organised by a coalition of
Fadhila detractors, including SCIRI and the Sadrists, with
the aim of toppling the governor.47 Taking advantage of
its influence in Baghdad, SCIRI supported a Kurdish
drive to open the oil sector to foreign investment and
thus enhance its own position as a key interlocutor for
outsiders. Fadhila tried to counter these efforts, going so
far as to cut off electricity to Baghdad in retaliation.48 The
outcome of this struggle remains undecided.
C. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
Basra residents generally share a fear of and distaste for
foreign meddling. The city’s location and abundant
natural resources have boosted its strategic importance
to neighbouring Iran and the Gulf monarchies. The
struggle opposing Iran on the one hand and Arab regimes
45 For an analysis on how this bill affects the struggle over
competing federal schemes, see for example Reidar Visser,
“Basra, the Reluctant Seat of Shiastan”, op. cit.
46 Fadhila allied with Iyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National
Accord and Hizbollah, a small Islamist group based in the
southern marshlands. SCIRI forged an alliance, known as al-
Bayt al-Khumasi, which comprises the Badr organisation
(SCIRI’s militia), the Sayid al-Shuhada movement (a small
Islamist movement), Tha’r Allah and Mu’assasat Shahid al-
Mahrab (an organisation belonging to SCIRI). Despite their
tense relations, the Sadrists and SCIRI are informally allied
against Fadhila.
47 “In response, Fadhila called upon other armed groups in
nearby governorates to support the governor, who has become
the party’s key asset. Its leader, Muhammad al-Ya’qubi, stated
that any effort to undermine the governor would be seen as an
attack against Fadhila as a whole. Indeed, all their interests are
now vested in the governor. The relationship between SCIRI
and the Sadrists is not getting any better but both are determined
to fight Fadhila”. Crisis Group interview, SCIRI militant, Basra,
May 2007.
48 Knights and Williams, op. cit., p. 23.
as well as the West on the other has heightened the local
sense of vulnerability. A political leader explained:
The local conflict cannot be separated from the
broader struggle between West [Gulf states and
Western countries] and East [Iran] because of
Basra’s strategic location and vast resources. In
the 1980s we found ourselves stuck between
Saddam and his Western and Arab allies on one
side and Iran on the other. In the 1990s, we were
caught between the regime and its former allies.
Now, Basra is at the crossroads of an Iranian-
American struggle, an Iranian-Arab struggle, the
struggle between factions inside Iran and an
American war against Islam as a whole. Every
actor in this string of conflicts is striving to take
up positions in Basra to influence the course of
events. Iran is supporting the Islamist parties with
which it has enjoyed longstanding ties, whereas the
U.S. is supporting local and regional forces that are
capable of challenging Iran’s influence. And so
on.49
In such a tense and polarised atmosphere, rumours of
military conflict that would engulf Basra are rampant. In
mid-2006, reports spread that British forces were gathering
at the Iranian border in anticipation of a large operation.50
The March 2007 crisis triggered by Iran’s capture of
British sailors generated similar fears.51
Leading local political actors routinely invoke the threat
of outside interference to justify their behaviour or evade
responsibility for their failures. When in 2006 most Sunnis
were forcibly expelled from the city as part of the massive
sectarian cleansing that followed the Samarra shrine
bombing,52 they were accused of being “infiltrated” by
Saudi Wahhabis.53 Whichever party happens to control
the governorate is inclined to blame insecurity and
inadequate services on foreign sabotage. A governorate
official explained that neighbouring countries fuel
instability and disorder in order to promote cross-border
trafficking, undermine Iraq’s economy and ensure that
Basra as well as the country as a whole continue to rely
49 Crisis Group interview, leader of Tha’r Allah, Basra, March
2007.
50 Crisis Group interviews, Sadrists, Basra, August 2006.
51 See Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 28 March 2007.
52 See Crisis Group Middle East Report N°52, The Next Iraqi
War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, 27 February 2006.
53 Crisis Group interviews, militiamen involved in sectarian
violence, Basra, August 2006. Wahhabism is a strand of Sunni
Islam which adheres to the most literalist reading of scripture,
allowing very little scope for rational deliberation or
interpretation and viewed by many Shiites as equivalent to the
al-Qaeda type of Salafism. Crisis Group Report, Understanding
Islamism, op. cit., p. 10.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 8
on imported goods.54 British forces themselves frequently
are accused of fuelling violence. A senior Fadhila official
said:
Iran and others are turning Iraq, and particularly
Basra, into the arena for their disputes. Although
the governor always is at the centre of the local
struggle, he should not be blamed for disorder or
corruption. The negative influence of regional
countries is the true reason behind the failure of
local government to develop Basra and provide
basic services.55
Local actors allege foreign involvement to disparage and
discredit local opponents. The most common charge is
that of being an Iranian agent – an accusation all sides
cavalierly hurl at one another. Tha’r Allah denounces
SCIRI and Fadhila as instruments of Iranian influence.
“The Iranians are not crazy or naïve enough to send their
own secret service agents, nor do they have to: thanks to
the parties that used to be exiled in Iran and those that
currently dominate the local government, they already
have Iraqi accomplices on the ground”.56 In like manner,
its rivals harshly criticise Tha’r Allah for its supposed
ties to Iranian intelligence which, according to Fadhila,
helped it carry out an assassination attempt against the
governor.57
More broadly, and even though other countries are
viewed suspiciously, Iran has become the focal point of
accusations of external meddling. Locals tend to assume
the omnipresence of Iranian intelligence throughout the
city. A local official commented: “Iran’s intervention in
Basra is far more powerful than Kuwait’s, to take one
example. Kuwait’s involvement is essentially economic
in nature, whereas Iran clearly is pursuing political
objectives”.58 In the words of a university professor,
54 “Countries such as Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are infiltrating intelligence agents into the city.
The deteriorating situation in Basra opens up our market to their
goods. Iraq as a whole spends huge amounts on imports from
these countries. That’s why they are seeking to prolong chaos as
long as possible”. Crisis Group interview, governorate official,
Basra, March 2007.
55 Crisis Group interview, senior Fadhila official, Basra, March
2007.
56 Crisis Group interview, senior Tha’r Allah official, Basra,
March 2007.
57 “The Major Crimes Unit [an elite police unit] has been
penetrated both by Iranians and by Tha’r Allah members. As
he himself has claimed, the governor escaped an assassination
attempt organised by that unit”. Crisis Group interview,
governorate official, Basra, January 2007.
58 Crisis Group interview, port authority official, Basra, August
2006. A British official concurred: “It is far more difficult for
the other Gulf states to have influence in the south, as many
Shiites see them as Sunni-dominated supporters of the former
“Iranian intelligence has established a presence in the
Iranian consulate, humanitarian associations, businesses
and pro-Iranian political parties”.59 Roughly similar views
are shared by British officials:
Iran uses a number of channels, both overt and
covert. It overtly runs trading companies, supports
pilgrims and is involved in legitimate political
dialogue with several political parties, chiefly those
such as SCIRI that resisted Saddam’s regime with
Iranian assistance. Iran’s policy essentially is to
seek the emergence of an Iraq with which it can do
business, that is non-threatening and where fellow
Shiites can live without fear of repression. Iran also
fears any foreign – and, specifically U.S. or UK –
military presence on its borders. In this respect,
Tehran’s security and intelligence officers have
been providing various militants seeking to force
our departure with covert technical support –
including weapons and sophisticated improvised
explosive devices.
How much Tehran’s influence has grown is very
hard to measure, given that many Iraqi Shiites
remain suspicious of Iran. At the same time, Iraqis
are often pragmatic and are willing to accept Iranian
support if it serves their interests. For that reason,
most parties still do business with Iran, because it
would be foolish for them to alienate their most
powerful neighbour. In a similar vein, while many
militants who attack coalition forces label
themselves nationalists, they are happy to accept
Iranian support to achieve their most immediate
goal, the eviction of the multinational force. The
true measure of Iran’s influence will be apparent
as coalition forces draw down, reducing the need
for Shiite tactical cooperation with Tehran.60
regime. Some, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are involved
in border security issues and local business deals and are seeking
contact with local tribes but, as they are mainly concerned with
what they perceive as growing Shiite (and therefore in their eyes
Iranian) influence, they have focused their efforts on establishing
relations with the central government and on trying to influence
Sunnis further north”. Crisis Group interview, defence ministry
official, London, February 2007. “The Arab Gulf states do not
have a southern sphere of influence to speak of and are doing
very little to build one. Their rhetoric and behaviour, echoed by
those of countries such as Egypt, amounts to saying they are
unhappy with the Iraqi government’s treatment of the Sunni
population. But we are still a long way from the Gulf monarchies
actively assisting Iraq’s Sunnis”. Crisis Group interview, British
official, London, February 2007.
59 Crisis Group interview, student, Basra, January 2007.
60 Crisis Group interview, defence ministry official, London,
February 2007. Other British officials echo this view: “Iran’s
primary objective is to ensure that the U.S. and UK suffer and
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 9
In Basra, more accounts (typically unsubstantiated)
abound. For some, Tehran’s ambitious and ruthless
strategy is to empty the south of its minority populations
in order to promote SCIRI’s goal of establishing and ruling
a vast Shiite southern region.61 This vision of a highly
Machiavellian Iran builds on deep and enduring wariness
toward their neighbour, rooted in the Iran-Iraq war and
older tensions between the Arab and Persian worlds.
leave. With regard to Iraqis, Iran is trying to build or maintain
good relations with anyone who is likely to matter, Sadrists
included. They are backing every horse in the race. All armed
groups are now accepting Iranian money, assets and training.
The Sadrists themselves have toned down their anti-Iranian
rhetoric and are taking Iranian money, even though Tehran
still enjoys closer ties to SCIRI. At the same time, Iranian aid
is going to charity groups, including Islamic ones, and,
particularly in the south they are investing in economic
activity”. Crisis Group interview, February 2007. On the issue
of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some sources claim
to be in possession of incontrovertible evidence. Cf. Knights
and Williams, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
61 “Parties that used to live in exile in Iran insist on their
sectarian version of federalism. In my view, this federalism is
a smokescreen behind which lies the goal of dividing Iraq into
three parts – Shiite, Sunni and Kurd. Sunnis, Mandaeans and
Christians were forced out of Basra. Iran has used its allies to
expel minorities and pave the way for its brand of federalism for
the region”. Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, January
2007.
II. OIL, MILITIAS AND THE
SCRAMBLE FOR RESOURCES
Although they are significant, the above factors – foreign
meddling, tensions between the city and Baghdad, and
Basra’s diversity – do not explain most of the violence.
Rumours notwithstanding, there is little hard proof
concerning the extent of outside interference. While Crisis
Group heard credible testimony of Iranian involvement,
its goal appears for the most part to be to promote attacks
against coalition troops rather than to fuel local,
internecine violence.62 Most of the evidence involves
support for operations targeting British forces, although
even then local militants are forced to rely on their own
resources as well. A Mahdi Army fighter said:
The border between Iraq and Iran is hundreds of
kilometres long. The British are not in a position
to block all Iranian support. The other day, we
received Katyusha missiles from Iran, and this
allowed us to shoot down a helicopter. But do you
think Iran is the only source of weapons for the
Mahdi Army? Of course not! We have to count
on others. For example an Iraqi general whose
help we requested turned us down, but – to avoid
any retaliation – he told us about an area full of
mines that had been left behind after the Iran-Iraq
war. Such local resources remain indispensable to
the Mahdi Army.63
Generally speaking, and although there is strong suspicion
of pervasive outside interference, inhabitants of Basra
acknowledge that their accusations against Iran stem from
rumour and logical deduction more than from fact. “It’s
true that Basra is a border city, adjacent to Iran, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, and we always hear about foreign –
particularly Iranian – interference. But we don’t have
any hard evidence”.64 Tehran’s influence in the south
clearly exceeds that of any other outside player, though it
appears to be exercised principally through local actors
who are engaged in domestic power struggles and
pursuing their own parochial interests – often seemingly
trivial, and sometimes at odds with their foreign backers’
strategic goals.
Iraq could be on the moon, and Iraqis would still
kill each other. Overestimation of the foreign
62 According to a Sunni imam, Iran did not have a hand in
the most brutal inter-confessional violence that led Sunnis to
flee the city. “Iran has religious and strategic interests in
Iraq. But I don’t think it has an interest in promoting chaos”.
Crisis Group interview, Basra, August 2006.
63 Crisis Group interview, Mahdi Army fighter, Basra, August
2006.
64 Crisis Group interview, local journalist, Basra, August 2006.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 10
influence over Iraq is evident in consideration of
Iranian influence in Iraq’s Shia community.…The
Shia are fighting their own civil war, with local
factions fighting for local reasons. Outsiders
meddle but they are peripheral to the main conflict
between the factions. Though Tehran may have
advantages over the Coalition in its struggle to
influence Iraqis – longer engagement with Iraq’s
Shia and greater insight into the local culture –
the Iranians, like all foreigners, swim in the same
confusing sea of local factions. For them, as for
anyone else, influence can only be rented, never
bought. 65
Likewise, the controversy over federalism and relations
with Baghdad, though frequently at the centre of debate,
does not account for much of the tension and daily
violence. Mostly, it has been cynically manipulated
by local and national politicians; average citizens,
disappointed by their leaders, seem to have lost interest.
With the rise of Islamist parties, the more cosmopolitan,
secular and moderate Basra citizens worried as early
as 2005 that federalism might mean domination by
conservative, backward-looking local government. A
chamber of commerce member said: “I don’t want to
have Basra separated from the central government because
I am afraid that religious parties will enjoy a free hand
and impose their rule”.66 In the eyes of some, Baghdad
became an indispensable safeguard and counterweight.67
Since then, pervasive violence, extensive corruption and
local mismanagement have further discredited a federal
agenda many initially had embraced. Politicians fight
over it, no longer because it reflects popular sentiment,
but because – with Iraq’s progressive break-up into
fiefdoms – federalism has become a stake in a wider
struggle for control.
Basra’s diversity, potentially a source of tension, largely
has been mitigated by the steady rise of armed Islamist
parties. The city’s tradition of open-mindedness and
tolerance for the most part has vanished and prominent
trading families have departed. Most non-Muslim
minorities have been forced either to migrate or lie low,
basically disappearing from the social scene.68 Even the
65 Knights and Williams, op. cit., p. 37.
66 Crisis Group interview, member of Basra’s chamber of
commerce, Basra, March 2005.
67 “We will always need some supervision from Baghdad. If
the governor wants to fire someone, for instance, he will have
to go back to Baghdad. Baghdad should keep an eye on local
decisions. And the national parliament should act as a kind of
watchdog”. Crisis Group interview, tribal chief, Basra, March
2005.
68 “One could say that Armenians and Chaldaeans have
altogether disappeared from Basra. As far as I know, all
churches are now closed. It is difficult, not to say impossible, for
Sunni presence essentially has become a thing of the past,
thereby reducing the potential for sectarian violence. A
British officer pointed out in February 2007:
Many Sunni families in the south have fled north
to Baghdad and Mosul. The fact that the ratio of
Sunni to Shiite is low, and diminishing, means that
sectarian violence is now less common than further
north. Sunnis cannot afford to be aggressive and
so there is less of a cycle of sectarian violence.69
Tribes by and large have been absorbed by Islamist parties.
Some were recruited into armed militias,70 others were
forcefully subdued, notably through the systematic
assassination of tribal sheikhs. A Mahdi Army fighter
said:
The Garamsha tribe is finished. It’s true that they
were a group of thugs and thieves, but their era is
now gone. Why? Because today Basra is wholly
politicised. Everyone must join a political party.
No one can remain independent. You have to
belong to a party to enjoy its support and protection
from others.71
The Shaykhiya Shiite minority, which also was the target
of brutal attacks, strived to remain neutral but was
compelled to establish its own militia while simultaneously
joining a non-aggression pact with the main parties.72
Christians to practice their religious rituals. Some Mandaeans
remain in Basra but their numbers are negligible. The Islamic
parties’ militias argue that Allah prohibits any religion other
than Islam. Our religious leaders instill our people with
backward thoughts”. Crisis Group email communication, Basraborn
medical doctor, May 2007.
69 Crisis Group interview, defence ministry official, London,
February 2007. That said, two Sunni mosques were blown up
on 15 June 2007 in retaliation for the earlier destruction of the
minarets of the Askari shrine in Samarra.
70 “In Basra, the tribes had started to steal, kill and kidnap for
their own benefit. But the politicians have since found a
way to turn them into their foot soldiers. Much of the militia
membership has been recruited from their ranks”. Crisis Group
email communication, Basra-born medical doctor, May 2007.
71 Crisis Group interview, Mahdi Army fighter, Basra, August
2006. The chief of the Garamsha, Hasan Jarih al-Garamshi, was
murdered in May 2006. Al-Zaman [Iraqi daily], 15 May 2006.
72 “After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the Shaykhiya tried to
steer clear of political conflicts and tit-for-tat violence. But some
people bombed their mosque and threatened to kick them
out of Basra on the ground that they were of Saudi origin. The
Shaykhiya then armed themselves but they also asked all Basra
political parties to sign a pact that would allow them to live
in peace. This was done at the ‘al-Zahra conference’ in
April 2006, which involved all of Basra’s key players”. Crisis
Group interview, journalist, Basra, August 2006. “As a
matter of principle, the Shaykhiya chose to stay away from
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 11
The end result has been monopoly control by a variety
of armed Islamist parties over Basra politics. In the
occupation’s early stages, they focused attacks on former
regime members, such as Baathists and military officers.
Over time, their target list extended to anyone potentially
threatening their political or economic interests, be they
Sunni or Shiite, doctors, engineers, journalists, tribal
chiefs or independent traffickers. Engaged in a brutal
scramble for resources and a vicious cycle of attack and
counter-attack, militias have become by far Basra’s
principal source of violence. This could well foreshadow
what will happen to the rest of the country once other
causes of strife – mainly, the fight against coalition forces
and sectarian violence – recede.
A. SUBVERTING THE STATE
Basra’s political transition gave parties a dominant role
in the emerging order without simultaneously compelling
them to honour the rule of law that was supposed to be
at the core of that order. As a result, groupings that could
acquire resources did so with impunity, acting more as
criminal gangs than political parties and using the electoral
process to participate in a system whose founding
principles they wilfully ignored. Once in power, they
neither sought to build social bases nor were able to govern
effectively; indeed, their thorough mismanagement cost
them significant public support. A university professor
remarked: “Although public services are deteriorating
by the day, local officials are always telling people that
they are busy with vital issues such as insecurity, described
as the cause for the absence of reconstruction. But the
people believe they are solely concerned with their own
politics. After the 2003 war, they kept their distance from all
political parties and preferred to remain isolated. But, by
threatening them, the parties forced them to get involved. That
is when the Shaykhiya brought the parties together in a
committee and informally discussed security issues, in the
process protecting both their neutrality and their safety. The
committee, which came out of the ‘al-Zahra conference’, was
called Basra’s Deliberative Council and meets once a month”.
Crisis Group interview, Mahdi Army fighter, Basra, August
2006. Designed to maintain the Shaykhiya’s neutrality and
safety, the committee also regulated relations between local
political actors. The Zahra agreement now appears to be in
jeopardy due to the intensifying conflict between Fadhila
and other Islamist parties: “The situation was relatively
calm in Basra but things are deteriorating rapidly. There used to
be an agreement or modus vivendi between the militias, tribes
and other actors but the rules have been broken. Now we have
this huge demonstration against the governor and occasional
armed clashes, which threaten to get out of hand”. Crisis
Group interview, local journalist, Basra, June 2007.
interests”.73 Yet, by contributing to a dynamic of violence,
they heightened their value as actors who could provide
protection and exact revenge.
Despite their names and their Islamist posture, the
dominant parties have not put forward a genuine
program or political agenda aside from the imposition of
conservative mores. It is far from clear whether the bulk
of their membership vows allegiance to any major Shiite
religious figure. “The Islamist parties do not follow the
clerics’ orders. In other words, no cleric can really
influence the Islamist parties if his rulings were to go
against their interests”.74 Even figures as powerful as
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani do not carry much weight
where local interests are at stake.75 As described above,
tensions even have arisen between the national leaderships
of various parties and Basra-based representatives
pursuing their own parochial concerns.
As a result, local institutions are ruled by a myriad of
factions intent on promoting their immediate interests.
The new political elite were propelled virtually overnight
into positions of responsibility for which they generally
were unqualified. Some of their more prominent members
are rumoured to have been little more than successful oil
smugglers during Saddam Hussein’s regime.76 Today, the
most significant criterion for personnel nominations and
promotions is factional loyalty.
The core of the problem in Basra is its incompetent
administration and weak military leadership. As
police chief, the governor chose an officer from
the former Iraqi army, specialised in radars, not
because he is capable of leading the police force
but for personal reasons. Thus we have a police
chief lacking experience and character.77
The local power apparatus is fragmented into myriad,
partisan fiefdoms. Fadhila, which controls the Oil
Protection Force – the unit responsible for safeguarding
wells, refineries and pipelines – essentially is in charge
of the oil infrastructure. The small Hizbollah party has a
73 Crisis Group interview, university professor, Basra, March
2007.
74 Crisis Group interview, governorate official, Basra, March
2007.
75 “Not every Islamist party follows the authority of Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the other ayatollahs in Najaf,
because the parties are pursuing different strategies and
agendas”. Crisis Group interview, Tha’r Allah leader, Basra,
March 2007.
76 The governor has become a convenient target for
unsubstantiated accusations of trafficking and ties to criminal
activity. Crisis Group interview, local government employee,
Basra, August 2006.
77 Crisis Group interview, senior governorate official, Basra,
March 2007.
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 12
strong presence in the Customs Police Force. For some
time now, SCIRI has been most influential in the
intelligence service. The Sadrist current dominates a
large segment of the local police force,78 together with
the Facilities Protection Service – supposedly in charge
of protecting governorate infrastructure – and the port
authority. The ports themselves are under the sway of
competing actors.79 This allocation of responsibility is
fluid and the object of intense rivalry.80
Parties fight most intensely over the three most valuable
assets: oil trafficking, control over security forces and
access to public services and resources. Evidence suggests
that local parties are massively involved in oil trafficking.81
This is openly acknowledged by some, including a Mahdi
Army fighter: “All parties, without exception, steal and
smuggle oil. I mean all of them – and that includes the
Sadrist current. It’s true that I belong to that current,
but I am being frank and honest”.82 Another said: “When
Moqtada al-Sadr met with representatives of his current in
Basra, he scratched his nose and said, mockingly, ‘I smell
the smell of gasoline’. That was his way of accusing his
own representatives of smuggling oil”.83
Smuggling takes different shapes. Some have accused
Fadhila, which has strived to control the Southern Oil
Company,84 of siphoning off diesel at its source,
78 “Most of the police operating in Basra are suspected of
having ties to the Sadrists”. Crisis Group interview, senior
officer involved in city’s security plan, Basra, March 2007.
79 “Basra has three ports. Abu Flus is controlled by the al-Ashur
tribe; al-Khur is held by SCIRI; Umm Qasr is dominated by
Fadhila”. Crisis Group interview, Mahdi Army fighter, Basra,
August 2006. Umm Qasr, by far the largest of the three, is the
locus of all kinds of trafficking, notably of imported car duties.
Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, January 2007.
80 Thus, when the governor belonged to SCIRI, it controlled the
Southern Oil Company, and its spokesperson was a former Badr
Corps fighter. Crisis Group interviews, Southern Oil Company,
Basra, March 2005.
81 “Alongside politics, Basra witnessed increased levels of
mafia-style killings related to control of extremely lucrative oil
smuggling rackets, which increasingly involved all the key
political factions operating in Basra. With literally billions of
dollars worth of oil bypassing the national oil export system into
the domestic and external black markets, Basra had become
financially indispensable to Iraq’s Shiite militias”. Knights and
Williams, op. cit., p. 31.
82 Crisis Group interview, Basra, August 2006.
83 Crisis Group interview, Mahdi Army fighter, Basra, August
2006.
84 Several observers assert that Fadhila has resorted to murder
to accomplish this goal. “In order to control Basra’s oil
institutions, Fadhila killed high-level officials and stacked
important positions with its loyalists”. Crisis Group interview,
journalist, Basra, August 2006. Of late, the Southern Oil
Company has shown growing signs of independence from
embezzling what it is supposed to monitor. Others are
said to drill holes into pipelines. “Smugglers drive a hole
in the pipeline, attach a faucet and then load up their trucks.
The diesel oil is taken to the port of Abu Flus and then
sold. Trafficking in Basra has given rise to a gigantic
and highly sophisticated mafia, comprising smugglers,
middlemen, accomplices within the oil ministry and so
forth”.85 Some tribes play a pivotal role as go-betweens.
A well-informed journalist said:
Basra’s tribal sheikhs are not reliable partners
in the fight against smugglers. Most show little
appetite for supporting security forces when they
clash with traffickers. Instead, they tend to help
the latter. Ordinarily, they will put their farms and
boats at the smugglers’ disposal. Those that do not
get involved in smuggling just tend to keep out of
the business to avoid being targeted.86
Many observers point to widespread cooperation between
traffickers and officials.87 Infiltration of the security
apparatus was greatly facilitated by a British hiring policy
that appears to have given precedence to quantity over
quality. New recruits were drawn by the prospect of a
salary (which sometimes amounted to a second one),88
government-paid weapons and political cover which gave
them impunity.89 A security official remarked:
Fadhila and the governor. “Over the past few months, the
company’s director has competed with the governor and
asserted himself on the local political scene. For example, he
has funded the refurbishing of roads. This came at the expense
of the governor’s popularity, as residents of Basra began to
wonder why the governorate hadn’t taken the initiative”. Crisis
Group interview, SCIRI militant, Basra, June 2007.
85 Crisis Group interview, businessman with ties to traffickers,
Basra, August 2006.
86 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, March 2007.
87 “The Bayt al-Ashur tribe is like a mafia. One of its members
was arrested by the police and then released on orders of Basra’s
governor. What does that mean? It means there is an agreement
between the traffickers and governor”. Crisis Group interview,
smuggler belonging to a rival group, Basra, August 2006. This
and other similar claims are generally unsubstantiated and come
from suspect sources – in this instance, one of the tribe’s
competitors. “The Facilities Protection Unit is there, the police
are there, and yet a modus vivendi exists between the various
parties. At night, trucks unload the oil into boats which is then
sold in Iran or in the Gulf states”. Crisis Group interview, Mahdi
Army member, Basra, August 2006.
88 Badr Corps members reportedly also are paid by the militia.
89 “Provision of jobs allowed militia leaders to demonstrate
largesse to their followers and simultaneously utilise federal
revenues to pay them. In no time at all, security forces were 0
per cent trained, 0 per cent equipped, 165 per cent manned, and
100 per cent paid. Other expedient measures included what one
British general termed the ‘pragmatic use of militias.’ Despite
the June 2004 CPA directive outlawing militias, both the local
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 13
Some of the crimes committed by members of
the security forces result directly from the police
recruitment procedures. In fact, there were no rules
for vetting applicants, but only one condition: those
who apply to join the military or the police should
not be members of the former intelligence, Fidayin
Saddam [an elite paramilitary formation under
Saddam Hussein] or Baath Party.90
Implications of this lax recruitment policy are still felt,
notwithstanding official British and Iraqi commitment to
end it.91 The governor still places loyalists in key positions.
More broadly, in the words of a party leader:
The security forces are entirely politicised. Each
party has taken its share of jobs in these institutions.
Most have gone to Fadhila. When Fadhila took
control of the governorate, it seized the opportunity
to name its members to important positions. Alas,
all of the more sensitive posts have been filled on
the basis not of competence but of membership in
an Islamist party.92
Ironically, coalition efforts to eliminate militias have
accelerated their penetration of the police and army. A
governorate official explained: “After December 2006,
when the U.S. began focusing on this file and pressuring
the prime minister to disarm the militias, the militias
stepped up their efforts to merge with the security
forces”.93 The end result has been a war between gangs
backed by the branches of various local security forces:
government and [the coalition] continued to pay stipends to key
tribes north of Basra in barely concealed protection rackets”.
Knights and Williams, op. cit., p. 25. In many ways, this practice
mirrors that of the former regime, which, for example, used
to pay the Battat tribe to protect local oil fields.
90 Crisis Group interview, official in charge of Basra’s
security plan, Basra, March 2007.
91 During a 31 May 2006 visit to Basra, Prime Minister al-
Maliki ordered a state of emergency, asserting: “We will not let
Basra keep bleeding with the existence of these gangs. Security
is first, security is second and security is third. Security forces
should not be subjected to harassment or pressure from political
forces. These things must be absolutely impermissible. The
security officer, the soldier and the policeman must not be afraid
or confused because of political interference”. Quoted by Knights
and Williams, who also provide details of the security plan, op.
cit., pp. 32-33.
92 Crisis Group interview, leader of a rival party to Fadhila,
Basra, January 2007. “Everyone is trying to control the security
services by stacking the most important positions with his allies.
Fadhila basically created the Oil Protection Force. Most of its
employees, obviously, are members of the party. Before, the
security services were mainly headed by SCIRI”. Crisis Group
interview, governorate official, Basra, January 2007.
93 Crisis Group interview, governorate official, Basra, March
2007.
Most of the Shiite parties in the south have been
involved in violence of some kind, including
Fadhila (the governor’s party). This has included
Fadhila members in the Iraqi police engaged
in extra-judicial killings and criminal activity. In
terms of the governor himself, he has feuded with
local tribal and political leaders on a number of
occasions, leading to clashes between Fadhila
supporters in the police and these other factions
(especially an ongoing feud with the Tha’r Allah
political party/militia).94
Murders committed by individuals dressed in security
force uniforms became rampant in 2006, when
assassinations peaked and are now routine – a fact that
explains the forces’ appalling reputation and highlights
their impunity.95 According to a militia leader, “80
per cent of assassinations in 2006 were committed
by individuals wearing police uniforms, carrying police
guns and using police cars”. 96 No party takes responsibility
for the violence.
Political parties also draw on public funds tied to the nonoil
sector. According to a local analyst:
Most projects and contracts meant to develop the
city are misappropriated by parties in charge of key
posts in Basra’s local government. They use them
to develop their internal party structures and
patronage networks. Officials routinely hand
contracts out to relatives, followers or people
94 Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official,
London, February 2007.
95 For a description of how, beginning in mid-2004, British
forces allowed special units to operate despite being thoroughly
infiltrated by the Badr Corps, Fadhila, Tha’r Allah and the
Mahdi Army, see Knights and Williams, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
96 Crisis Group interview, senior leader of the Tha’r Allah
militia, Basra, August 2006. An account of a 2006 clash
between Tha’r Allah and Fadhila illustrates how security forces
are perceived to be manipulated by parties seeking to maximise
their power: “In order to justify an attack against the mosque
that serves as Tha’r Allah’s headquarters, the governor spread
rumours according to which cars used to commit crimes had
been seen near the mosque. The governor ordered the army and
the police to launch an offensive against the mosque. The two
generals in charge of the army and police, neither of whom
belongs to Fadhila, refused and subsequently were punished.
The governor then signed a new order in which he assumed
entire responsibility for the operation. This time, the army
obeyed. During the offensive, the sister of Tha’r Allah’s leader
was killed, along with other family members. The fight became
personal. Since then, mediation efforts have failed. Tha’r Allah
joined forces with the Bani Asad tribe once it attacked the
governorate in retaliation for [the] assassination”. Crisis Group
interview, journalist, Basra, August 2006. Other accounts differ;
according to some, SCIRI assassinated the Bani Asad leader.
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 14
willing to pay kickbacks. Such large contracts
consume a substantial part of the budget and, for
the most part, yield very little.97
Although the governor receives much of the blame, from
both local and foreign observers,98 the problem almost
certainly is far more widespread.99
All in all, efforts by political parties to subvert the state
have resulted in its break-up into myriad component parts,
none of which can implement an effective public policy.
“The main problem that results is a lack of institutional
capacity, which means it is difficult to effect change in
the province as a whole. Rather than cooperate, parties
and tribes look after their own constituencies”.100
B. CIRCUMVENTING THE STATE
The political process was supposed to produce governing
institutions capable of reining in the militias; instead, the
militias at best ignore, quite often rob and at times confront
those very institutions. Almost as soon as the former
regime was toppled, Islamist parties took over police
functions and extended their authority. A high-level
Sadrist official asserted:
Some people think that taking part in elections is
the only way of being active. But, without even
having to participate, we are present throughout
Basra’s administration. From those positions, we
directly combat disorder and depravity. We do this
by guiding people, by explaining religious
concepts. We also fight drug dealers and alcohol
retailers by destroying their stocks, warning,
arresting, and ultimately handing them over to the
police. Do we think violence is the only way? Yes.
People cannot just do whatever they want. A person
97 Crisis Group interview, university professor, Basra, March
2007. He added: “Basically, reconstruction projects turn out to
be either mere repainting jobs or outright scams. High quality
equipment can be imported at great cost and then remain in
storage since nobody has the training required to use it”.
98 See Knights and Williams, op. cit., p. 23.
99 “All those who work in town hall are unqualified. Many
presented forged diplomas and most are corrupt. All of Basra’s
residents know this, but we just don’t have hard proof. Officials
link up with companies that are then awarded the most lucrative
contracts”. Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, January
2007.
100 Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official,
London, February 2007. “Bogus projects and contracts are used
to cover up stolen funds. As a rule of thumb, if the real cost of
paving a street in Basra is 35,000,000 dinars [approximately
$30,000], the contract would be evaluated at around 450,000,000
[approximately $360,000]!” Crisis Group interview, governorate
employee, Basra, March 2007.
in his home has the right to be free, free to choose
his clothing, his movements, his way of sleeping,
eating, talking and so forth. But as soon as he
receives a guest, he must behave differently as a
sign of respect. When he leaves his home, naturally,
his freedom becomes even more circumscribed.101
The militias’ actions do not merely reflect a conservative
moral agenda. They also aim to make up for the state’s
perceived inability to protect the community from the
terrorist attacks that hit Basra in 2006. According to an
observer:
After a bomb went off in a marketplace, one of
the militias murdered Dr Yusif al-Hasan, a Sunni
religious scholar who was accused of financing
such operations. Had he been arrested, legal
procedures would have dragged on before he even
appeared before a judge. Militias would rather kill
the terrorists themselves without even alerting the
police – all the more so since laws are not rigorously
enforced. All kinds of pressures are brought to bear
to release terrorists from prison.102
Ironically, the process has become self-reinforcing. The
same parties that complain about lack of law enforcement
intervene to obtain the release of imprisoned members.103
Likewise, they are the first to oppose disciplinary action
against security force members if they belong to their
organisation. A tribal leader remarked: “If the ministry or
the governorate decide to dismiss an officer, he usually
will remain in his post if he belongs to a powerful tribe
or party”.104
Conversely, competent officers risk discharge if they
lack militia support. Overall, this pattern has tended to
undermine both the police force and the judiciary. In a
British official’s words:
The police cannot confront the militias, which are
simply too strong. Besides, local leaders are under
all kinds of pressure. In order to take forceful action
against the militias, one would need leaders who
come from outside the city. But if the police chief
is from Basra, he simply cannot escape the web of
101 Crisis Group interview, Sadrist official, Basra, March 2005.
“Other parties work just like the Sadrists do. SCIRI, for
example, has taken on a policing function. They arrest thieves,
people who sell alcohol, etc. Fadhila armed itself to kill Baathists
and terrorists”. Crisis Group interview, Mahdi Army fighter,
Basra, August 2006.
102 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, August 2006.
103 “We can’t afford to turn over prisoners belonging to the
Mahdi Army to the police because they will be freed”. Crisis
Group interview, British official, Basra, January 2007.
104 Crisis Group interview, tribal leader, Basra, August 2006.
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 15
tribal, social and political connections that
inevitably will determine his behaviour.105
A governate official added: “Today, the police fear the
citizen, not the other way around. They are afraid he
may belong to a powerful party”.106
The inability of local authorities to protect the community
greatly reinforces the power and influence of parties and
tribes. Merchants and businessmen buy protection by
sharing profits with their so-called guardians.107 Some
tribes extort companies doing business in areas under
their control.108 A growing and increasingly violent
power struggle in Basra has further eroded what is left
of governorate authority. Throughout 2006, political
assassinations snowballed into a cycle of lawless revenge
killings.109
Whatever semblance of order exists is above all the result
of a balance of power between militias. Security forces
act at best as bystanders, at worst as one or another side’s
accomplice. Informal, unofficial mechanisms also are used
to regulate violence. For example, a number of tribes
signed a pact relieving them of responsibility for acts of
violence committed by a member acting on behalf of a
political party. In the words of a tribal chief, “all members
of a political party who commit a crime for the sake of
that party automatically forfeit their tribe’s protection,
because their primary allegiance is to a political party”.110
105 Crisis Group interview, British official, Basra, January 2007.
106 Crisis Group interview, governorate official, Basra, January
2007.
107 “One of the parties’ principal sources of funding are large
companies. For example, one of the large companies might fear
Tha’r Allah and give it what it wants. Merchants also hand over
a percentage of their gains to powerful individuals”. Crisis
Group interview, intellectual, Basra, January 2007.
108 “We allocate reconstruction projects to Iraqi entrepreneurs
but they often are reluctant to accept because they are
blackmailed by tribes. Sometimes, tribes insist on receiving
half the estimated budget. And so, we try to hire members of
the tribe in order to satisfy them and reduce the pressure”.
Crisis Group interview, official involved in reconstruction
sector, Basra, August 2006.
109 A Basra teacher described one such event, although he
provided no solid supporting evidence: “After the murder of the
head of the Sa’id tribe, Fadhila spread the rumour that SCIRI
was responsible. The tribe immediately burned down SCIRI’s
headquarters. But the son of the murdered chief, who survived
the attack, recognised the culprit, a member of the Mansur tribe.
The Sa’id tribe arrested him and videotaped his interrogation,
in which he admitted he was working for Fadhila and for the
governor. The Sa’id hung him from a tree and then put him on
fire, in front of everyone”. Crisis Group interview, teacher, Basra,
August 2006.
110 Crisis Group interview, tribal chief, Basra, August 2006.
“Listen to this story: after killing a Baathist, a Sadrist was ordered
More broadly, extra-institutional forums have become
privileged arenas of conflict resolution, further
undermining official institutions, most notably the
judiciary. A journalist remarked:
In Basra, the best way to resolve or mitigate
problems growing out of increased insecurity is to
organise meetings between party chiefs, religious
leaders and tribal figures. Some people say that this
kind of gathering undermines the government’s
work by marginalising it. Others think that they at
least have the merit of reducing armed conflict. I
agree with the former, because these meetings occur
at the expense of any legality or legitimacy.111
Such informal agreements have a dual impact: they reduce
the ferocity of violence and render it tolerable, regulating
its intensity so that it falls within acceptable bounds. They
thus enable the perpetuation of mafia-rule, simultaneously
undercutting governorate authority and ensuring that
militia-on-militia fighting does not become selfdestructive.
A British officer said: “Basra is in a state
of fragile stability – government and central organs of
authority can operate, but as part of a framework which
includes religious, tribal and party forces. As these
relationships lose their balance, violence breaks out,
until balance is restored, usually through truces or
external intervention”.112
Meanwhile, alongside such regulated violence, the brutal
political struggle goes on. Parties perpetually shift alliances
based on ever-changing interests and calculations. Once
locked in a bitter struggle with British forces, Fadhila
forged a closer relationship with them during the second
half of 2006.113 Such marriages of convenience, which at
times can bring together actors at war in other parts of the
country, rarely last very long.
Behind a democratic facade, the emerging system is
capable of perpetually generating violence. Today, many
parties are calling impatiently for local elections (even as
they do very little at the national level to make this happen)
by the victim’s tribe to pay some form of compensation [fasl],
as is common under tribal law. The Sadrist was forced to sell
his house to pay the 30 million dinars [approximately $24,000]
that was being asked because he did not enjoy his tribe’s
support”. Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, August
2006.
111 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Basra, August 2006.
112 Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official,
London, February 2007.
113 “In recent months, the governor has been increasingly
cooperative with the British – probably because the British saved
his life in August”. Crisis Group interview, British official,
January 2007.
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Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 16
in the hope of defeating Fadhila.114 Many Basra residents
harbour the same hope.115 Yet, while new elections may
well reshuffle the political deck, it is about all they will
do. The same set of actors will remain and any political
transition within the existing framework almost certainly
will not end their violent conflict. Besides, given the role
of armed militias, elections are unlikely to be fully free
and fair and to produce a genuine political alternative. The
withdrawal of British troops will not help. Ominously, two
tribal leaders told Crisis Group they would kill the current
governor as soon as coalition forces stopped protecting
him.116
The most plausible scenario would be for SCII and the
Sadrists to join forces to defeat Fadhila before once more
turning against each other. Smaller militias such as Tha’r
Allah or Hizbullah would then align themselves with one
or the other. While one of the two ultimately may prevail
– a function of local and external support – its dominance
would be unlikely to remain uncontested, guaranteeing a
prolonged and localised form of insurgency.
114 Sadrists and members of the Badr Corps are allied against
Fadhila in Basra even though they are bitter enemies in Baghdad
and elsewhere. “Following the principle ‘the enemy of my enemy
is my friend’, SCIRI and its allies have become close to the
Sadrists. In other words, Sadrists and SCIRI are united in their
goal of beating Fadhila at the polls in Basra. In fact, many
conspiracies are being hatched to get rid of Fadhila”. Crisis
Group interview, journalist, Basra, January 2007. In March
2007, both SCIRI and Tha’r Allah were calling for swift local
elections. Crisis Group interviews, high-level officials of both
parties, Basra, March 2007.
115 Crisis Group interviews, Basra residents, Basra, August
2006.
116 Crisis Group interviews, tribal chiefs, Basra, August 2006.
III. OPERATION SINBAD
Between September 2006 and March 2007, British forces
carried out Operation Sinbad which they presented
as a response to the militia problem. Among the
principal objectives was to fight militia infiltration of
security services, improve police performance and
reduce fratricidal violence. At first glance, results
appeared somewhat promising. Although he
conceded that “a sustained improvement will require
a much improved police force”, a British defence official
claimed: “Factional and political in-fighting had their
spikes throughout 2005 and 2006. Criminality,
especially the murder rate, which had been rising, has
dipped to some extent as a consequence of recent
operations”.117
At closer look, the picture is less encouraging. Some
British data defies credibility. The claim that approximately
90 per cent of the city’s and governorate’s police stations
have reached a “satisfactory” level,118 for example, is
belied by testimony from first-hand witnesses. Most
underscore the vast gap separating the army – whose
performance is assessed as decent albeit imperfect – from
the police, judged to be wholly inadequate. In early 2007,
a British official acknowledged: “The Iraqi army has been
involved in Sinbad and been given moderate tasks, which
it has done satisfactorily. The police are a problem
throughout the country. Work is still ongoing on police
reform but they are not at a stage where they can be
tasked to perform any role”.119 During the operation’s
waning days, an Iraqi officer directly involved in
implementing the security plan evoked the “weakness of
117 Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official,
London, February 2007.
118 “As a result of Operation Sinbad, 92 per cent of police stations
within Basra city are now assessed at a satisfactory standard (up
from 9 per cent in September) whilst in the wider province of
Basra, nearly 92 per cent of stations are now up to standard (up
from 38 per cent in September)”. British Ministry of Defence,
“Coalition Military Presence in Iraq”, available at
www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/
OperationsInIraqKeyFactsFigures.htm.
119 Crisis Group interview, British official, January 2007. “The
Iraqi army has generally demonstrated superior capabilities than
the police, although I would still argue it lacks heavy firepower
that would give it a decisive edge against militias and tribes. The
quality of the police has improved but its loyalties remain split.
Many police still owe their loyalty to political parties and tribes,
and there are still elements involved in criminal and sectarian
activities. This is a longer term problem and reflects the wider
nature of Iraqi society, where family, tribe, political and religious
ties still supersede relatively new central institutions of authority”.
Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official, London,
February 2007.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 17
the police and the obvious lack of confidence between
police forces and citizens”.120 Most importantly, the
militias lost little or nothing of their authority. According
to a British defence official:
Militia activity varies. Recent operations may have
forced them to keep their heads down, but they are
still there and likely to remain part of the fabric
of daily life for some time because of their
entrenchment within Iraqi society. Public
perceptions vary. The militias do not enjoy universal
support but they still operate with a degree of
public tolerance because of their social welfare
activities, mistrust of official security forces and
the simple power of numbers.121
British officials confess not to know how to tackle the
problem Operation Sinbad was supposed to resolve.
Sinbad was conceived as a last-ditch effort prior to a
troop drawdown and, as far as one can tell, no serious
thought was ever given to an alternative plan in the event
of failure. A British official noted during the operation’s
final stages: “I don’t think there is much of a Plan B should
Sinbad not succeed as we hope”.122 Instead, responsibility
for coming up with an answer apparently has been
delegated to Iraqis, most of whom depend on armed
groups for their survival. In a British defence official’s
words, “reducing the importance of militias is now more
of a question for the Iraqis, depending on how they
choose to implement legislation such as CPA Order 91
[a 2003 U.S. decree that established a mechanism for
disbanding militias but was never implemented] or
conduct other disarmament or integration programs”.123
More realistically, another British official remarked:
Badr and the Mahdi Army are the largest militias
and a clash between the two presents the greatest
threat of destabilising Basra. That said, both are
weary of precipitating a conflict that could spiral
out of control. Badr is rebranding itself [as a
non-military organisation] and concentrating on
placing its members in the security forces. Most
of the attacks targeting coalition forces are
120 Crisis Group interview, Iraqi official, Basra, March 2007.
121 Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official,
London, February 2007.
122 Crisis Group interview, British official, January 2007.
123 Crisis Group interview, British defence ministry official,
London, February 2007. Help certainly will not come from
central authorities. “Though such militias and their allied
politicians will violently compete at the local level, they
also will periodically close ranks whenever foreign or national
interlopers seek to reestablish some degree of control over the
deep south or restore a modicum of security for the population.
In essence, the deep south has become a ‘kleptocracy’ in which
well-armed political-criminal Mafiosi have locked both the
central government and the people out of power”. Ibid.
conducted by “rogue” Mahdi Army members and
smaller militias operating outside the reach of
central control. Criminal activity conducted by
these and other militias (such as Tha’r Allah) poses
a greater threat to stability but, again, there are
internal mechanisms at work that generally balance
out the various forces. The result is very messy,
but generally it works.
Essentially, the key problems are caused by inter-
Iraqi competition, which is something only they
can solve. We are unlikely to see central security
forces strong enough to completely dominate the
ground in the near future, so Iraqi compromise and
deal-making will be the best way forward,
something that is already happening.124
Of course, it is just such a situation that gives rise to
massive corruption and undermines any semblance of state
authority. Despite the long list of projects that have been
carried out pursuant to Sinbad,125 their tangible impact
appears negligible. There is wide-scale diversion of funds
and the work performed often is shoddy. The balance sheet
is all the more disappointing given how much Basra
residents need after years of war and central government
neglect.126
124 Ibid.
125 See www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Operations
Factsheets/OperationsInIraqKeyFactsFigures.htm.
126 “Basic services remain a problem – money has been invested
in civilian infrastructure, but institutional inertia and corruption
mean it does not always achieve the desired result. Power
generation has increased, but there are major systemic problems
caused by years of under-investment (plus there has been an
enormous increase in demand), which means that hours of
power availability fluctuate. The other problem is that in the
absence of security, it is difficult to conduct substantial, longlasting
reconstruction work”. Crisis Group interview, British
defence ministry official, London, February 2007.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°67, 25 June 2007 Page 18
IV. CONCLUSION
When asked what ought to be done to restore Basra to
normalcy, its residents display remarkable and surprising
consensus. Above all, they demand that heads of
institutions be qualified, competent and, most importantly,
unaffiliated with any party. They also demand regulation
of party activity and a strengthening of the judiciary – a
sector that, up until now, has suffered from extraordinary
neglect compared to the police and army.127 What they
are asking for, in short, is the rule of law.
This aspiration, sound as it may be, is incompatible with
the gradual disengagement of British forces from Iraq.
In Basra, the British appear to have given up on the idea
of establishing a functioning state, capable of equitably
redistributing wealth and resources, imposing respect for
the rule of law and instituting a genuine and accountable
democracy. In any event, time is running out. Four years
after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, they are facing
increasingly frequent and bloody attacks, and it is hard
to imagine them remaining for long. Indeed, even were
the coalition to re-engage in Basra, it already may well
be too late to salvage the situation by creating a
functional state. Over time, local government in the
south could well resemble a small failed state; the
government might collapse, a victim of the ruthless
struggle between unregulated and uninhibited
militias.
As the U.S. considers plans for Baghdad and other parts
of the country, the lessons are clear. First, the answer to
Iraq’s horrific violence cannot be an illusory military surge
that aims to bolster the existing political structure and
treats the dominant political parties as partners. Secondly,
violence is not solely the result of al-Qaeda-type terrorism
or sectarian hostility, however costly both evidently are.
Thirdly, as Basra clearly shows, violence has become a
routine means of social interaction utilised by political
actors doubling as militiamen who seek to increase their
share of power and resources.
Basra teaches that as soon as the military surge ends and
coalition forces diminish, competition between rival
factions itself will surge. In other words, prolonging the
same political process with the same political actors will
ensure that what is left of the Iraqi state gradually is torn
apart. The most likely outcome will be the country’s untidy
break-up into myriad fiefdoms, superficially held together
by the presence of coalition forces. The priority, as Crisis
Group outlined in an earlier report, is to confront the power
structure established in the wake of the 2003 invasion, as
well as the parties that now dominate it, by insisting on
127 Crisis Group interviews, Basra, March 2007.
genuine political compromises and a more inclusive
system.128 It is high time that Washington and London
acknowledge that their so-called Iraqi partners, far from
building a new state, are tirelessly working to tear it down.
Damascus/Amman/Brussels, 25 June 2007