A world awash in heroin

And much of it from one unruly region of Afghanistan

THE smell of the Afghan poppy season is unmistakable, even from the open door of a Black Hawk helicopter. NATO Soldiers in Helmand province see the expanse of purple and pink blossoms flashing by, but they do little to stop drug production; they worry instead about Taliban fighters mingling among the villagers, and are grateful to avoid being shot down.

Yet the opium economy and the insurgency are mutually reinforcing; drugs finance the Taliban, while their violence encourages poppy cultivation. Not surprisingly, perhaps, both problems have grown more severe in recent years, nowhere more so than in Helmand.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the province is set to harvest another record crop this year, producing more opium (and from it heroin and other illegal drugs) than the rest of Afghanistan put together. Indeed, this surge has overshadowed the past decade's striking decline in the “Golden Triangle”—the border region of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos—which UNODC says is “almost opium free”.

Afghanistan has put a blot on what UNODC says is a hopeful global picture. Its latest “World Drug Report”, published on June 26th, says that the market has largely stabilised for all classes of illicit drugs—including heroin, cocaine, amphetamines and cannabis. The global area under cultivation for both poppy and coca has declined over the past decade, although improving yields mean opium production has reached record levels while cocaine remains steady. Demand for opiates and cocaine is stable. Moreover, UNODC reckons that a startling 26% of global heroin production and 42% of cocaine output has been intercepted by government authorities. Meanwhile, cannabis cultivation in Morocco, the source of 70% of hashish in Europe, has dropped. World production of amphetamines and similar stimulants appears to be steady.

The drugs business is by far the most profitable illicit global trade, says UNODC, earning some $320 billion annually, compared with estimates of $32 billion for human trafficking and $1 billion for illegal firearms. The runaway Afghan opium trade—worth around $60 billion at street prices in consuming countries—is arguably the hardest problem. Heroin is finding new routes to the consumer, for instance through West Africa to America, and via Pakistan and Central Asia to China.

The opium market puzzles experts. They say there is now an over-supply of opiates, but the price for farmers or drug users has not changed much. UNODC suspects opium is being hoarded, and that traffickers are squeezing their vast profit margins and increasing the purity of heroin doses to maintain stability.

At the time of the 2001 war in Afghanistan, the Taliban were blamed for presiding over widespread poppy cultivation. Yet they did impose a successful but short-lived ban in 2000. Their Western-backed successors have been less able to stop the inexorable spread of poppy farming. These days, says NATO, Taliban commanders and drug smugglers are often one and the same.

Afghanistan last year produced the equivalent of 6,100 tonnes of opium, about 92% of the world total. There is an interesting divergence: in areas controlled by the government, production is either decreasing or stable (or even poppy-free); where the insurgency is strongest, it is for the most part increasing.


Nevertheless, the impact is felt throughout Afghanistan. The opium trade is worth about $3.1 billion (less than a quarter of this is earned by farmers), the equivalent about a third of Afghanistan's total economy. It has forced up the exchange rate, sucked in unproductive luxuries and stoked a boom in construction, particularly around Kabul. In a country as poor as Afghanistan, opium rots any institution it touches. Some of the biggest drug barons are reputedly members of the national and provincial governments, even figures close to President Hamid Karzai. The whole chain of government that is supposed to impose the rule of law, from the ministry of interior to ordinary policemen, has been subverted. Poorly paid policemen are bribed to facilitate the trade. Some pay their superiors to get particularly “lucrative” jobs like border control.

Despairing of the failure of the anti-narcotics effort, formally led by Britain, which has focused on seeking alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers, the United States has been pushing for a more aggressive eradication campaign with aerial spraying. Its experts say that incentives alone will never work when farmers can earn eight or nine times more from poppy than from wheat. “You need a stick as well as a carrot,” says one senior American official. To show that aerial spraying works, the Americans point to UNODC's estimated 52% reduction in coca cultivation (but not cocaine output) in Colombia since 2000. However, European governments and many military commanders strongly oppose such draconian measures, fearing they will drive even more Afghans into the arms of the Taliban.

American officials were outraged last April when British commanders used a local radio to tell Helmand villagers that foreign and Afghan troops “do not destroy poppy fields” and “do not want to stop people from earning their livelihoods”. At military checkpoints, British soldiers assure passing Afghans they are there for reconstruction, not eradication, and they often turn a blind eye when they find opium.

President Karzai has so far allowed only limited destruction by hand or with tractors. But this cautious approach has arguably made matters worse in places like Helmand. The discretion allowed to local government and police officials to choose which fields should be destroyed turned last February's eradication effort into a “harvest of money” as some Afghans called it. Wealthier or better connected farmers bribed police to spare their crops. Poorer farmers bore the brunt, while some of the nastiest warlords-cum-druglords were hardly touched.

Some 500 police officers, backed by American security men with helicopters, raked in about $3m, according to some officers. They were supposed to destroy 12,000 of the estimated 100,000 hectares of poppy in Helmand. They claimed 7,000 hectares had been ripped up, but the UN verified only half this amount. Ordinary policemen averaged $1,000 each in backhanders. “We do a dangerous job and we get $70 salary a month,” said one, “If we are killed there is no money for our families. We just have to make money while we can.” One police colonel is said to have treated himself to a new Lexus car.

Can Afghanistan learn from the successes of other countries? Thailand rid itself of poppy by an active policy of encouraging alternative economic development. But through the 1980s and 1990s it enjoyed strong economic growth driven by tourism and exports, and a fairly stable government. A lobbying group known as the Senlis Council says Afghanistan should copy Turkey and India in licensing legally poppy farming to make painkillers, such as morphine and codeine. This would draw farmers away from the drug barons and the Taliban, provide a source of income and improve skills by helping farmers to make painkiller tablets in their own villages.

The Senlis Council argues that a large unmet need for painkillers could be filled by Afghanistan, particularly if it undercuts other producers. UNODC disagrees. It says there is no shortage of such drugs; the problem is poor distribution and many countries' lack of medical experience in using opiates. In any case, says UNODC, the inability to punish those who break the rules means licensing could increase demand for illegal poppies.

Romesh Bhattacharji, India's narcotics commissioner until 2001, supports the Senlis Council. Pointing to the millions of new cancer cases every year, he argues that too many patients are dying in unnecessary agony. But he also enumerates the difficulties: in India, the government must survey 70,000 farms, suppress illicit cultivation, resolve countless disputes over allocations and prevent the theft or diversion of crops. This may be beyond the ability of a fragile state like Afghanistan.

Another option under discussion is to stimulate licit agriculture, perhaps by guaranteeing prices for non-poppy crops. Afghanistan is, after all, within striking distance of the lucrative markets in the Gulf. But such measures might encourage smuggling of produce from neighbouring countries. In any case, encouraging agricultural exports requires more than higher prices, not least refrigeration, reliable electricity, safe roads, finance, marketing skills and access to markets. Dry opium, by contrast, can be stored almost indefinitely and often acts as a family's store of wealth.

UNODC officials propose some partial steps, including targeting laboratories that convert opium to heroin, taking action against some of the best-known drug smugglers to signal the government's seriousness, and rotating police officers frequently, particularly those in bribery-prone positions such as border posts. Ultimately, though, halting Afghan opium production means reducing demand in Europe and other drug-consuming states. Progress in Afghanistan, if it comes, is likely to be incremental and will involve a mix of eradication, development, stimulating agriculture and licensing poppy. But all these measures require the same elusive ingredient: a stable government that controls its own territory and borders.