Night Raid in Iraq: Seeking Militants, but Also Learning the Lay of the Land

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

FORWARD OPERATING BASE KALSU, Iraq — Capt. Eric Nylander passed the word down the line of soldiers in the darkened Chinook helicopter: “Ice,” meaning the landing area was free of enemy fighters.

The helicopter touched down, and the troops, night vision devices fixed to their helmets, scrambled over the canals and through a boggy field to the farmhouses in the distance.

The mission was to detain as many of the 31 militants on the soldiers’ target list as they could find, uncover arms caches and generally develop intelligence on an area where substantial numbers of American troops had not been for months.

The raid, involving 310 soldiers flown to multiple landing zones northeast of Iskandariya on July 16, was the largest air assault since the Third Combat Aviation Brigade of the Third Infantry Division arrived more than a month earlier.

As American forces hunt for insurgents in the Sunni-dominated belts surrounding Baghdad, air assaults have become an increasingly important tactic.

The helicopter operations have enabled American forces to leapfrog over bomb-seeded roads and difficult terrain to pursue insurgents in remote regions in rural Iraq. But the Americans have also had to contend with an elusive foe accustomed to fading away in the face of a determined attack. “It was a battle-tested way to operate in Vietnam, and it is still a viable technique for operating now in the current fight that we find ourselves in,” said Maj. Greg Kanicki, the operations officer for the Third Combat Aviation Brigade.

The area of the assault, Chaaka Three, is a stretch of soggy farmland northeast of Iskandariya. The canals that crisscross the area restrict the mobility of military vehicles. Some of the important roads have been blocked by powerful, buried bombs and cuts in the road.

The Third Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, was based in the area, at Forward Operating Base Kalsu, late last year, but then was ordered to Anbar Province to establish control over the heavily contested town of Karma.

By the time the battalion returned to Kalsu in June, Sunni Arab militants had stepped up their activities in the Iskandariya area. The number of roadside bombs placed on Route Tampa, a major north-south supply route, increased. Sunni insurgents in the area had also begun to press the Shiites to the south. The air assault was a way for the battalion to re-establish its presence in an isolated area, detain insurgents and pick up intelligence on the region.

“We’ve been gone a long time, and nobody had really been in the area,” said Col. Valery Keaveny, the Third Battalion commander.

The Third Combat Aviation Brigade was to fly in the troops. During its first month in Iraq, the brigade had conducted more than 40 assaults. But this was to be the largest.

Four Chinooks and four Black Hawk helicopters were to fly from the aviation brigade’s base on the outskirts of Baghdad to Kalsu, where they would pick up two companies of soldiers. The troops would be ferried to their landing zones one company at a time, along with the “Shark,” communications gear mounted on a four-wheel-drive vehicle that would enable the battalion commander to control the operation.

Each Chinook can carry 30 soldiers, compared with 11 for a Black Hawk. But the larger helicopters require more time to unload the troops, making them more vulnerable.

Apache attack helicopters would use their night vision system to look for “squirters,” militants who try to run away, so a quick-reaction force on two Black Hawks could be whisked in to nab them. An unmanned aerial vehicle was kept on station.

The night of the raid there was no moon, but through the greenish hue of night vision goggles, the helicopters were visible as they flew in to pick up the troops. The soldiers sat waiting in darkness off to the side of the airstrip. The hot wash from the choppers buffeted them as they landed. The first company clambered into the aircraft. Captain Nylander’s company was the second wave.

A crucial part of air assaults is making the call on the safety of the landing zones: “cherry,” if there is too much enemy resistance to land, or “ice,” if it is safe to unload troops. But this night, the problem would not be enemy fire during landing, but rather finding the foe.

After Captain Nylander’s men rushed down the ramp, they moved in on nearby homes. One of the people who the Americans were looking for was suspected of arranging the travel of foreign fighters into the area. First Lt. Caleb Curlin spied the man’s photo, proudly displayed on the wall of one home.

But neither he nor any other Iraqi men were to be found. The homes were filled with anxious women and children who slept through the episode in the steamy heat on mats on the floor. The women insisted that the men in the area had left months ago or had been detained by the Americans. Lieutenant Curlin was not convinced.

Efforts to elicit cooperation were no more successful. The lieutenant asked the women if they felt safer with American troops nearby; they said that they did. The lieutenant offered money for help in finding arms caches. The women said they would be happy to volunteer such information without pay, but knew of none.

The lieutenant was unhappy that he did not have a mixed group of men and women to question. When men are present, he said, it was possible to question them separately and then check their accounts against those provided by women.

The Americans used a portable device to take the women’s fingerprints and scan their retinas, a standard practice to develop a biometric record of the Iraqis in the area. The soldiers searched a wall-high pile of linen and bed mats, leaving them in a heap in the floors, and went through drawers and wardrobes looking for incriminating materials.

Soon word came over the radio that other soldiers had had more luck. An arms cache had been located and destroyed. Other suspects had been detained, including two Iraqi men who were observed trying to sneak away along a canal. A small group of detainees were handcuffed, blindfolded and marched to a rendezvous point in the field so they could be flown away along with the troops.

There had been no exchange of fire, but far fewer detainees than the 31 people that the soldiers were looking for. Days later, the final tally was reported: Of 11 Iraqis who had been seized, 3 had been questioned and released. Of the 8 who remained in custody, 3 were considered “high-value targets,” meaning senior insurgents.

The Americans had also snatched several machine guns, found a car that was used to assemble roadside bombs, seized $2,700 sewn into a man’s suit, and found an Iraqi police uniform and a large number of identification cards.

Lieutenant Curlin took a philosophical view. The soldiers had learned more about the Iraqis who lived in the area, including a sheik. And they had a better understanding of the terrain for future operations. “It is good to get a little bit of lay of the land, what it looks like, for the next time you come,” he said.